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In the Supreme Court 
Of the State of Utah 
CARL JOHANSON and CLARA J. 
JOHANSON, his wife, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, Case No. 
vs. 6302 
CUDAHY PACKING COMPANY, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
PETITION OF RESPONDENT FOR REHEARING 
AND SUPPORTING BRIEF 
The Cudahy Packing Company, respondent in the 
above entitled cause, hereby respectfully petitions this 
Court to rehear and reconsider the questions of law 
involved in the case at bar for the r.easons hereinafter 
stated. In making such petition attention is called to 
the fact that by statute it is made the duty of the Court 
that whenever a cause is remanded for a new trial in 
the District Court, this Court shall pass upon and deter-
mine all questions of law involved in the case presented 
upon appeal and necessary to a final determination of 
the case. (Section 104-41-23, R. S. U., 1933.) 
Although four written opinions were delivered by 
the justices of this court on this appeal, it is believed 
by the counsel who presents this petition that it cannot 
as yet be determined with certainty whether the insurance 
carrier shall be limited in its recovery, if recovery is 
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allowed, to the amount which it actually paid to the 
dependents of the deceased servant, or whether it shall 
be permitted to recover, if recovery is allowed, damages 
in excess of the compensation awarded and paid to the 
dependents. 
In seeking the reconsideration applied for the 
respondent contends: 
1. That the subrogation of the insurance carrier 
provided for in Section 42-1-58, Revised Statutes of 
Utah, 1933, takes place by operation of law, and is not 
dependent on contract or privity. It is not an assignment 
nor is it synonymous therewith, and therefore the statute 
conferring the right of subrogation upon the b.surance 
carrier did not make the cause assignable to the insurance 
carrier; nor did it open the door to general assignability. 
(71 Utah 112.) (138 U. S. 595.) 
2. The right of the insurance carrier to recover 
damages from the tort-feasor, a stranger to the employ-
ment, created by Section 42-1-58, Revised Statutes ·of 
Utah, 1933, cannot be classified as a right of property 
capable of inheritance. Rather it is one strictly personal 
in its nature, the existence of which will not survive either 
the death of the wrongdoer or the death of its owner. 
This right of action to which the self-insuring master 
or the insurance carrier of that master is by statute 
subrogated cannot survive for or against the estates 
of deceased persons under any provision that can be 
found in Utah's Survival Statutes, Sections 102-11-5, 
102-11-6 and 102-11-7. 
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It is not an action for the ''recovery of any property, 
real or personal," nor is it an action for "wasting·, 
destroying, taking or converting the g·oods of another 
person,'' nor is it an ''action founded upon contract.'' 
(263 Pac. 78.) The wrong of the tort-feasor, if wrong 
there was, was delictual in character. It was a violation 
on his part of some duty imposed upon him by law, not by 
contract. The right to recover for such wrong never 
has been assignable in this state except for the period 
intervening between July 1, 1921, and June 26, 1933, 
on which last named date the legislature expressly re-
pealed the provision making causes of action for either 
injury or death assignable. (See amendment-1939.) 
3. Assuming for the purpose of argument the sub-
rogation of the insurance carrier to a property right 
(one capable of inheritance) to recover from the tort-
feasor, a stranger to the employment, the amount of the 
compensation award made and paid by the insurance 
carrier, then the right claimed in the complaint in this 
particular case is not that property right. The right 
claimed by the plaintiffs in this case is the right which 
the dependents of Johanson might have had to sue for 
wrongful death if such dependents had not applied for 
and been awarded compensation. Plaintiffs cannot 
change their theory on appeal, and when the plaintiffs 
cannot and have not, this Court is without power to 
change such theory. A decision authorizing insurance 
carrier to recover on the theory that it has a property 
right for reimbursement of amount paid by it is in 
direct antagonism to the theory of the complaint in the 
case at bar. 
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4. Assuming for the purpose of argument that the 
statute provides for the subrogation of the insurance 
carrier to a property right, i. e. one capable of inheritance, 
then that subrogation by the very terms of the statute 
is not complete, and for that reason not actionable until 
the insurance carrier has paid in full the amount of the 
compensation award. Until the subrogation of the in-
surance carrier is complete, until its title to the so-called 
''property right'' vests, no valid assignment of such 
right can be made. "It is contrary to rational thought 
to say that a suit can be maintained upon the assignment 
of a nonexistent thing." ( 275 Fed. 333.) 
5. Because it affirmatively appears of record that 
the Trial Court, upon sustaining the demurrer of the 
defendant, allowed plaintiffs ten days within which to 
amend their complaint, and the plaintiffs by their at-
torneys in open court declined this right to amend and 
refused to plead further and elected to stand upon the 
complaint of the plaintiffs, and because that complaint 
was ''insufficient as against a general demurrer," 
(quoting Mr. Justice Pratt), then the Trial Court com-
mitted no error in entering judgment for the defendant; 
and because no error was assigned by the appellants, or 
could have been assigned, (that the Trial Court erred 
in not allowing the plaintiffs to amend), then this Court 
has no power on appeal to reverse the judgment of the 
Trial Court on that ground. Errors not assigned cannol 
be reviewed. Errors not made by the court and therefore 
not assigned by appellants cannot be reviewed. When 
a demurrer to a complaint is sustained and the com-
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plainant declines to amend, the Trial Court cannot do 
otherwise than render judgment for the defendant. If 
the ruling of the Trial Court is right, even though the 
reasons giYen for that ruling are wrong, the judgment 
must be affirmed. ''This Court can help only one who 
helps himself." (164 Pac. 1052.) The plaintiffs have 
never yet withdrawn their refusal to amend. The actual 
facts as shown by the award of compensation made by 
the Industrial Commission on August 22, 1938, make it 
apparent that the award of compensation has not been 
paid and cannot be paid until June 3, 1944. 
6. The order of this Court allowing costs to appel-
lants is against law. It is obviously a mistake by the 
Court. On what theory can costs of appeal be allowed 
against the respondent? The mistake, if mistake there 
was, was that of the appellants, but there was no mistake. 
The appellants filed the complaint they intended to file 
and alleged therein what they intended to allege. Under 
existing facts they could not allege payment of award. 
In the brief that follows, the respondent will argue 
and undertake to support by authorities each of the 
foregoing propositions. 
MARLON E. WILSON, 
ROBERT C. WILSON, 
Attorneys for Respondent. 
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CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL 
And now comes Mahlon E. Wilson and hereby certi-
fies that he is the attorney for the defendant in the 
above entitled cause; that he has prepared the foregoing 
petition for rehearing and its supporting brief; and he 
further certifies that in his opinion there is good reason 
to believe that the judgment and decision made by this 
Court and objected to by the respondent herein is er-
roneous, and that the cause ought to be re-examined 
and reconsidered by this Court. 
MARLON E. WILSON 
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BRIEF AND ARGUMENT 
FOREWORD 
The rule of the Common law to the effect that in 
a civil court the death of a human being cannot be com-
plained of as an injury may be anomalous to a scientific 
jurist, but it is explicable on historical grounds. rrhis 
statement has been obtained from the opinion rendered 
by Lord Parker in the case of Admiralty Commissioners 
vs. Steamship America, A. C. 38, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 877 
(1917). Referring to an early criticism made by Lord 
Bramwell, Lord Parker said: 
"It was, he considered, anomalous that a 
master should be entitled to recover for loss of 
service if his servant were wrongfully injured, but 
should be without any remedy if his servant were 
wrongfully killed. If it were any part of the 
functions of this House to consider what rules 
ought to prevail in a logical and scientific systern 
of jurisprudence, much might no doubt be said 
for this criticism; though it is not, in my opinion, 
by any means clear that the anomaly does not in 
reality consist rather in granting the remedy in 
the former case than in refusing it in the latter. 
In a society based so largely as our own is at the 
present day upon contractual obligations, it does 
not appear why the wrongful injury of A, where-
by he is prevented from fullfilling his contractual 
obligations to B, should confer on B a right of 
action only where these obligations are those aris-
ing out of the relationship of master and servant, 
or, indeed, why the right should not be extended 
so as to cover all loss, whether arising out of 
inability to perform a contract or otherwise.'' 
(Ann. Cas. 1917B, 878.) 
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Lord Sumner also rendered an opinion in deciding 
the case above cited. In the course of that opinion he 
among other things said: 
''Mr. Solicitor urged that such a principle is 
highly technical and that, if a minor hurt to a 
servant gives a cause of action to a master, a 
fortiori must the major hurt which results fatally, 
and he reminded your Lordships that this House 
in the case of Mills vs. Armstrong (1888) 13 App. 
Cas. (Eng.) 1, overruled Thorogood vs. Bryan 
(1849) 8 C. B. 115, 65 E. C. L. 114, a case of long 
standing, and exhorted your Lordships to take 
heart and do likewise. This is hardly the right 
view to take of your Lordships' judicial functions 
nowadays, nor does it follow in the case of a legal 
system such as ours, that a principle can be said 
to be truly a part of the law merely because it 
would be a more perfect expression of imperfect 
rules, which, though imperfect, are well established 
and well defined. Again, an established rule does 
not beccome questionable merely because different 
conjectural justifications of it have been offered, 
or because none is forthcoming that is not 
fanciful.'' (Ann. Cas. 1917B; · 884.) 
And again on Page 885 he said : 
'' There never was an action to recover 
damages for the death of a human being in the 
sense now contended for, and the remedy by 
appeal which so long persisted in the case of the 
widow, the most crying case of all, was one which 
the most hardened formalist would not have 
tolerated, had any such action at law been possible, 
for it was long a form of legalized blackmail. 
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The historical explanation of the absence of 
such an action at the suit of relatives applies 
equally to the case of a master's claim for the 
death of a member of his familia, for example, 
a servant. It is equally incapable of judicial 
creation. Indeed, what is anomalous about the 
action per quod servitium amisit is not that it 
does not extend to the loss of service in the event 
of the servant being killed, but that it should exist 
at all. It appears to be a survival from the time 
when service was a ~tatus.'' · 
Referring to the maxim actio personalis moritur 
cum persona, Lord Sumner said: 
"If, however, this maxim is put aside, since 
in the present case it is irrelevant, I think that 
the argument that your Lordships should discover 
under this ancient form of action some principle 
hitherto undetected is really an appeal to this 
House in its legislative and not in its judicial 
capacity.'' 
The facts of the case just cited may be stated as 
follows: It was conceded that in the year 1912 the Steam-
ship America collided with a submarine belonging to 
the English government ; that the America was · alone 
to blame for the collision. As a result of that collision 
the submarine was lost, and except for one officer, 
all of its crew, consisting of an officer and fifteen sailors 
of the Royal Navy, were drowned. Among the items 
of damage claimed by th~ United Kingdom was a sum 
of 5140 English Pounds, or approximately $25,000, repre-
senting the capitalized amount of pensions and grants 
payable to the relatives of the men who were drowned. 
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These pensions and allowances were granted under sta-
tutory authority according to authorized scales. The 
question involved was the right of the English govern-
ment to obtain indemnity from the owners of the offend-
ing steamship for the amount of pensions which, pur-
suant to act of Parliament, England was compelled to 
pay to the relatives of the sixteen men who were drowned 
by reason of the conceded negligent act. 
It was held: 
''that a person who negligently caused the sinking 
of a naval vessel, and the death of the sailors 
thereon, was liable to the Crown for the value 
of the vessel but not for the value of the pensions 
paid by the Crown to the dependents of the 
deceased.'' (Ann. Cas. 1917B, 887.) 
The decision of the House of Lords, rendered Decem-
ber 19, 1916, denying liability, compels the admiration 
of every man who believes in the principles of constitu-
tional government as contradistinguished from arbitrary 
and capricious action. The attitude of these English 
jurists, as particularly expressed by Lord Sumner when 
he distinguishes between the legislative and judicial 
capacity of the House of Lords, has been the bulwark 
of the judicial systems of England and America. Neither 
England nor America as such can long survive if that 
bulwark is destroyed. 
In America the courts have no legislative capacity, 
and whenever an American judge exercises such a ca-
pacity he usurps a power that he does not possess. 
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This Eng·lish case has been quoted from in this 
foreword to this brief for the purpose of emphasizing 
the duty of the bar as well as the bench. The disposition 
to legislate is constant, but it should be resisted and 
destroyed. A study of the case must yield benefit to 
the mind of eYery person who is interested in the history 
of the law controlling the relation of master and servant, 
which \Yas in the beginning· one of status but has now 
become one of contract. 
At common law the master was entitled to recover 
for a loss of service if his servant was wrongfully in-
jured, but that master was without remedy if his servant 
was wrongfully killed. The remedy for the injury did not 
survive the death of either the wrongdoer or the master, 
and therefore it was not assignable. No question could 
arise relative to the survivability or assignability of the 
master's claim for the death of his servant because the 
master had no claim. 
Whether the law should provide that any person 
sustaining pecuniary loss by reason of the wrongful 
death of another person should have a right of recovery 
against the wrongdoer is a legislative and not a judicial 
problem. The enactment of such a law would result in 
consequences tremendous in their character. It is sub-
mitted, however, that no greater reason can exist for 
a recovery from a wrongdoer by an insurance carrier 
of the amount that it has been required to pay to satisfy 
an award of compensation for the death of a servant 
than for a recovery from a wrongdoer by a life insurance 
company of the amount that it has been required to pay 
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to satisfy a claim for the death of the insured. The death 
is the principal event in both cases. To assert that it is 
a mere incident in either is a denial of that which is 
obvious. Both contracts of insurance are indemnifying 
in their natures. The liability insurance company pays 
a loss sustained by the dependents of the deceased serv-
ant, the amount of which is determined by applying the 
standards prescribed by the Compensation Act. The life 
insurance company pays an amount fixed by agreement 
at the time the contract of insurance is made. There 
is no reason why the amount of the loss cannot be agreed 
upon in advance of injury as well as thereafter. In 
ordinary life insurance the insurer and insured in effect 
fix the value of the insured's life in the contract and 
at the time of the contract. The amounts of premium 
paid are dependent upon the fixed value of the life of the 
insured. 
Neither of these contracts is of a wagering character 
unless they are for the benefit of persons who have no 
insurable interest in the life of the insured; unless .they 
are for the benefit of persons who have a greater interest 
in the death of the insured than in a continuance of his 
life. Such contracts are void ab initio. 
If the death of the insured, employed or unemployed, 
is caused by the act of a third person, i. e. a stranger to 
the contract of employment or to the contract of insur-
ance, then the act is wrongful only if the person who 
commits it violates some civil duty imposed upon him, 
not by contract, but by law. The wrongful act may con-
stitute murder and yet it cannot create a civil cause of 
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action unless a eiYil remedy in favor of some person has 
been created by statute. In the absence of such statute 
no one has a civil cause of action. 
A judicial controversy or even a private quarrel 
cannot exist without at least two adversaries. A contract 
requires two parties. A cause of action requires a plain-
tiff who has a civil remedy, and when he has, a right 
exists. There must be a violation of that right by the 
defendant. The idea that a tort can be committed by 
one without legally injuring another is a real absurdity. 
Blind men cannot see; oceans do not burn, and causes 
of action cannot exist in~ependent and apart from some 
person possessed of a remedy for the enforcement of 
such causes. 
The established rule is that no one can exercise a 
statutory remedy unless he comes within the statute. The 
English Crown in the case cited was not a beneficiary 
in Lord Campbell's Act, and as a result the English 
Crown had no cause of action. 
The insurance plaintiff in the Brame case was not 
within the Louisiana death statute, and as a result the 
insurance company stated no cause of action. (95 U. S. 
754; 24 L. Ed. 580.) 
The heirs of Charles Thorpe, deceased, were not 
within the Wyoming statute, and as a result their com-
plaint stated no cause of action. (24 Utah, 476; 68 Pac. 
145.) 
The Brame case well illustrates the point. The insur-
ance company, as plaintiff, alleged that Brame had fel-
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oniously killed McLemore; that McLemore's death had 
caused a pecuniary loss of $7000 to the insurance com-
pany. It was plainly alleged that Brame had done wrong; 
that he had committed murder, but his violation of law 
did not create cause of action in favor of the plaintiff 
insurance company, because the plaintiff was not given 
any remedy in the death statute and had no remedy at 
common law. McLemore in his lifetime could have made 
contracts without number. His death would have pre-
, vented performance and caused great pecuniary loss, but 
a tort-feasor who kills another incurs no liability to per-
sons contracting with or employed by the deceased un-
less the wrongful act is done to another with malicious 
intent to injure him by destroying his contract relation. 
(Nothing of the kind involved here.) 
Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co. vs. N. Y. N. 
H. & Hartford R. R. Co., 25 Conn. 293; 65 Am. Dec. 
571 (1856). 
No one can successfully dispute the power of a state 
legislature to enact a law which would change these rules 
and make liable defendants who had acted as Brame was 
charged to have acted, but the liability of the defend-
ant, if imposed by statute, could not be otherwise than 
delictual in character. Such a statute would not change 
that in the slightest particular. The statute would pro-
vide a remedy to an insurance company and a conse-
quent right. The measure of damages would be fixed at 
the amount of the insurance paid. Availing itself of such 
a statute, the insurance company would be enforcing its 
own cause of action. That cause of action would not be 
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based on a property right, i. e. one capable of inheritance. 
\Yhy, if not because of the character of the wrong done 
by a Brame 1 The wrongful act would be a personal 
tort. The natural death, or even the suicide, of either 
the plaintiff or the defendant would destroy the exist-
ence of that right. (Of course the statute could change 
the rule as to survivability.) The remedy would not be 
aYailable for litigation against the estate of the defend-
ant in the absence of statute. 
In order to find a property right it is necessary that 
the remedy for its enforcement shall pass to the estate 
of the person injured, and that the liability of the wrong-
doer shall at his death become a liability of his estate. 
\Yhenever that which was a personal right is made assign-
able by statute without qualification, then, of course, such 
right becomes property, capable of inheritance; but when 
its assignability is limited to a particular person as as-
signee, then the thing assigned is still personal. 
Bates vs. Sylvester, 205 Mo. 493; 104 S. W. 73; 
120 Am. St. 761 (1907). See this case.) 
These observations are made to be used as general 
principles in a consideration of the discussion of the 
specific points made in the petition for rehearing. The 
contentions are six innumber, Contentions 1, 2, 3 and 4 
involve the meaning of Utah's Compensation Act, par-
ticularly Section 42-1-58, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933. 
Robert Johanson, the deceased, met his death on June 3, 
1938. On that date Section 42-1-58 read as follows: 
"42-1-58. Id. WRONGFUL ACT OF 
THIRD PERSONS-SUBROGATION. When 
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any injury for which compensation is payable un-
der this title shall have been caused by the wrong-
ful act of a third person, the injured employee, or 
in case of death his dependents, may at their op-
tion claim compensation under this title or have 
their action for damages against such third per-
son; and, if compensation is claimed and awarded, 
the employer or insurance carrier having paid the 
compensation shall be subrogated to the rights of 
such employee or his dependents to recover against 
such third person ; provided, if such recovery shall 
be in excess of the amount of the compensation 
awarded and paid, then such excess, less the rea-
sonable expenses of the action, shall be paid to the 
employee or his dependents. (L. 21, p. 165, Sec. 
3133.) 
CONTENTION NO. 1 
THE SUBROGATION OF THE INSURANCE CAR-
RIER BY THE STATUTE WAS NOT ASSIGNMENT 
It has been held in this case in the opinion written 
by Mr. Justice Pratt and concurred in by Chief Justice 
Moffat, "that the cause of action under Section 42-1-58 
in favor of the insurance carrier may be assigned.'' This 
decision is based upon the ground that the cause of ac-
tion is considered ''in the nature of a property right,'' 
"one which should survive to the successor of the in-
surance carrier the same as any other cause in the na-
ture of a property right.'' 
In a separate opinion concurring in the result, Mr. 
Justice Wolfe held that because Section 42-1-58 subro-
gated the employer or insurance carrier which paid the 
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compensation to the rights of the injured employee or his 
dependents in case of death, to recover against the third 
person, the cause of action had been made assignable by 
that section of the statute; that such statute, having made 
an ex delicto action assignabl~ to the party paying the 
compensation, had the legal effect of opening the door 
completely to general assignability. (In other words 
a license granted to one, is a license to all.) 
:Mr. Justice Larson, concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part, held that the right to recover damages to 
which the insurance carrier had been subrogated was not 
assignable. 
~Ir. Justice J\IcDonough dissenting, held that such 
right was not assignable. 
Two of the justices held . that the judgment of the 
District Court should be affirmed ; two of the justices 
held that ''the complaint was insufficient as against a 
general demurrer since it does not contain an allegation 
that the insurance carrier has paid the award.'' The 
other justice in effect held that the payment of the 
award by the insurance carrier was a ''condition pre-
cedent" to obtaining title to the cause of action; that 
such cause of action or cause for the action is the negli-
gent killing of the employee. 
The right of the plaintiffs to maintain this action 
cannot be sustained if the cause of action for which re-
covery is sought was not assignable. Assignability of a 
cause of action presupposses the existence of the sub-
ject of the assignment at the time such assignment was 
made. A want of assignability may exist (a) because of 
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the general nature of the action, or (b) because of the 
non-existence of any cause of action. If the insurance 
carrier did not have vested in it a cause of action at the 
time of the assignment, then, of course, the assignment 
relied upon in the complaint cannot be otherwise than a 
nullity. 
By Section 42-1-58 above quoted it is in effect pro-
vided that if the death of a servant protected by theW ork-
men 's Compensation Act is caused by the wrongful act 
of some stranger to the employment, the dependants of 
that servant are given by the statute one of two alterna-
tive remedies, and consequently one of two alternative 
rights. To obtain the first remedy, viz.: that of compen-
sation, was the chief purpose of the Workmen's Compen-
sation Act. It consists in the dependents applying for 
and having awarded to them compensation as against 
the master for whom the servant was working at the 
time of his injury which resulted in death. By providing 
this remedy, then the legislature under the Constitution, 
Article XVI, Sec. 5, as amended in 1920, had the power -
to abrogate entirely the right to recover damages for 
injuries resulting in death. 
Halling vs. Industrial Commission, 71 Utah, 112; 
263 Pac. 78 (1927). 
But the legislature, within its lawful power, gave 
the dependents of the deceased servant the right to elect 
and take a second remedy. If these dependents did not 
elect to take the first remedy and pursue it to the point 
of obtaining an award of compensation against the 
master, then the statute provided this second remedy, 
viz: these dependents might have their action for damag-
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es against the stranger who wrongfully caused the death 
of the servant. 
These two remedies are disjunctive-not conjunctive. 
They are alternatiYe. If the dependents elect to take 
compensation and obtain an award, as it is alleged they 
did in the case at bar, then they never becatne vested 
1vith or acquired any right to have an action for dwnapes 
apainst the stranger who wrongfully caused the death 
of the servant. The dependents became vested with the 
right of choosing one of two remedies, but until the 
choice was made no right to either existed or was vested. 
\\lien the dependents claimed and were awarded com-
pensation, then they had no further interest in the 
matter except to recover their compensation either in a 
lump, if so awarded, or in periodic payments, if so 
awarded. The right to recover the damages sustained 
by them because of the death of the servant against the 
third person never became their right because they 
claimed and had awarded to them the compensation 
provided for by the Act. The taking of compensation, 
which was certain and inexpensive to obtain, precluded 
the taking of the right to recover damages from the 
third person. 
In the case at bar it is alleged in the complaint that 
the dependents voluntarily applied for and obtained an 
award against the master. The risk of that master was 
carried by the London Guarantee & Accident Company, 
Ltd., hereinafter called the insurance carrier. The 
statutes provides: 
''if compensation is claimed and awarded, the 
employer or insurance carrier having paid the 
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compensation shall be subrogated to the rights 
of such employee or his dependents to recover 
against such third person." (It then has a pro-
vision relative to the distribution of the amount 
of recovery, if any, the effect of which will bll 
hereafter explained.) 
The right to recover damages which the dependents 
might have taken but did not take 4id not become exist-
ent as a cause of action until the insurance carrier paid 
the full amount of the compensation award. Between 
the time of the award of compensation and the payment 
of that award by the insurance carrier, it was a pure 
fiction. In view of the fact that the dependents were 
compelled to elect as between compensation from the 
master or damages from the stranger whose wrongful 
act had caused the death of the servant, and that such 
dependents were not allowed to have both of these reme-
dies, or, rather, were allowed to have only one of such 
remedies, it can be said with absolute accuracy that the 
J ohansons in this case never became possessed with any 
right to recover damages against the stranger or third. 
person. It would be an absurdity to assert that because 
the dependents declined the remedy of recovery against 
the third person, therefore the insurance carrier was 
made an assignee of a non-existent right. 
Some effect must be given to the provision under 
consideration, and therefore it should be read:: ''The 
insurance carrier having paid the compensation, shall 
be subrogated to whatever rights the dependents would 
have had to recover against such third person if such 
dependents had not applied for and had not claimed and 
obtained an award of compensation." These and these 
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only are the rights of the insurance carrier as they are 
provided in this statute. At the time of the death of the 
servant they came into existence as available remedies 
resulting in inchoate rights. The dependents, if they 
so elected, could have such rights in themselves, but if 
such dependents claimed and obtained an award of 
compensation against the master, then the rights to 
recover damages against the third person never vested 
and could not vest in the dependents. If the award of 
compensation was made in favor of the dependents and 
against the master, the latter's insurance carrier could 
have the rights to recover damages from the third person 
vest in that carrier only by paying in full the amount of 
compensation awarded in favor of the dependents and 
against the master. 
What is Subrogation? It has been defined as the 
substitution of another person in the place of the creditor 
to whose rights he succeeds in relation to the debt. The 
facts in the case at bar do not fit into this definition 
except by applying the terms of the statute. Subroga-
tion is a legal fiction by a force of which an obligation 
extinguished by payment made by a third person is 
considered as continuing to subsist for the benefit of 
that person who paid the obligation. 
Now, what is the obligation to be paid, applying 
Section 42-1-58~ The award of compensation in this 
case is $31.16 every four weeks for a period of six years 
from June 4, 1938. 
The Award: It is like unto a judgment payable in 
periodic future installments, payment to cease on a fixed 
date. (e. g. judgment for alimony.) It is actually (no 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
22 
fiction here) subsisting as a right of dependents and as 
an obligation of the insurance carrier, which obligation 
arises out of the contract of insurance with master. If 
all of the dependents should die, with all sums due at 
the date of death fully paid, but with installments still 
unpaid because not yet due, would the right to such in-
stallments be the subject of inheritance by the heirs of 
the dependents 1 (135 Am. St. 775.) 
See also Hunt vs. Monroe, 32 Utah, 428; 91 Pac. 
269 (1907). 
(A decree for alimony or maintenance, payable in 
the future in periodic installments, is not a judicial debt 
of record.) 
To What is the Insurance Company Subrogated? 
The right to recover damages from the wrongdoer is 
still a "bird in the bush" -not a "bird in hand." (This 
figure is used in 135 Am. St. 775.) It is considered 
as subsisting as a right to the dependents to recover 
damages from the tort-feasor for the negligent killing 
of the servant. This consideration of such right is 
fictional because the dependents never possessed that 
right. When the award is made, this right is no longer 
available for choice by the dependents, but when the 
award is paid by the insurance carrier, then, and not 
till then, the insurance carrier becomes vested with that 
right to recover damages from the wrongdoer. That 
right then becomes a "bird in hand" of the insurance 
carrier. The award is actually gone. All rights of 
dependents have been satisfied and discharged. 
The fiction commences to function as to the award. 
It is still considered as subsisting but only for the pur-
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poses (a) of giving a right to the insurance carrier to 
recover a judgment for damages against the wrongdoer, 
and (b) measuring the extent of the insurance carrier's 
rights in the judgment when and if one is recovered by 
the carrier against the wrongdoer. The action (call it 
security or what not) against the wrongdoer is ex delicto 
in character from the date of the accident until it is 
merged into a judgment. It is for a tort and is a personal 
right protected by the Constitution when once vested, 
not amenable to execution or bankruptcy and not a subject 
of inheritance. 
The Judgment; Its Amount; Distribution of Its 
Proceeds: The judgment is property. The proceeds 
realized from the judgment are to be distributed, first 
to reimburse the insurance carrier for the amount of 
compensation awarded and paid. (If because of a death 
of some of the dependents the carrier should be relieved 
from paying the full amount of the award, or a part 
of that award abated, then, of course, the extent of the 
reimbursement would be reduced to the amount paid. 
The extent of recovery from the wrongdoer by the in-
surance carrier would likewise be reduced.) The excess 
remaining after reimbursement of carrier, less the rea-
sonable expenses of the action, is then paid to the de-
pendents. If either all of the dependents die or the 
wrongdoer dies prior to judgment the action for damages 
ceases to exist. (120 Am. St. 761.) 
Too often in a consideration of these questions one 
IS inclined to overlook the effect of the death of the 
wrongdoer. 
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Brown vs. Wightman, 47 Utah 31; 151 Pac. 366; 
L. R. A. 1916A, 1140 (1015). 
Clark vs. Goodwin, Adm., 170 Cal. 327 ; 150 Pac. 357; 
L. R. A. 1916A, 1142 ( 1915). 
Each of these two cases involves the death of the 
wrongdoer. (It is a fact that the author of the Utah 
opinion collaborated with the author of the California 
opinion before either of said opinions were rendered.) 
The fact that the dependents of the deceased servant 
may have paid to them an excess upon the distribution of 
the proceeds of the judgment is not to be construed as 
meaning that they have any interest in the action. On 
the other hand, such excess so paid should not be con-
sidered as a gratuity from either the self-insuring master 
or the insurance carrier or the wrongdoer. The self-
insuring master or the insurance carrier is reimbursed 
to the extent of all sums paid out to satisfy the award 
of compensation. In addition to these sums the master 
or insurance carrier is allowed costs expended, counsel 
fees and all reasonable expenses incurred and paid in 
the prosecution of the action against the wrongdoer. 
Any further sums, if received by either the master or 
insurance carrier, would be profit from a source that 
should not yield profit. Public policy would condemn the 
taking of such profit. 
Brown vs. Southern Ry., 204 N. C. 668; 169 S. E. 
419 (1933). 
In this North Carolina case the court held: 
''When the employer seeks to recover the 
amount paid by him from such third party his 
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hands ought not to have the blood of the dead or 
injured workman upon them when he thus invokes 
the impartial powers and processes of the law. 
It also said : 
"If it be conceded that I was negligent, you 
were also guilty of negligence. If I killed the 
deceased, you participated actively in the killing. 
Sound public policy, sanctioned and adopted by 
the decisions of the Supreme Court, forbids you 
to profit b:~ your own wrong to pluck good fruit 
from the evil tree of your planting.'' 
\Vhat this North Carolina Court said relative to the 
disputed question of the effect of the contributory negli-
gence of the employer cannot occasion very much dispute 
relative to the distribution of the proceeds of the judg-
ment. 
Take the other side of the problem. The wrongdoer 
should not be required to pay any greater amount of 
damage than that actually sustained by the dependents. 
Their damage should be limited by the extent of the 
dependency. It is not believed that the measure of 
damages applicable to Section 104-3-11, where compan-
ionship is an element, can be the measure of damages 
in an action prosecuted by the dependents under Section 
42-1-58. 
The right to compensation under the Compensation 
Act is given to those who are actually dependent on the 
deceased. That they were not legal heirs of the deceased 
is of no consequence, but ''the statute was not designed 
as a city of refuge for the negligent third party." 
(Brown vs. Southern Ry., supra.) If that third party, 
the tort-feasor, should not pay greater damages than 
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those actually sustained, such tort-feasor should not 
pay less than such amount ; otherwise, he will profit 
by his wrong. He is not required to pay compensation 
because he injured or killed a servant. His liability 
rests on his fault. He should not get a benefit from the 
Compensation Act unless he is brought under that Act. 
(Some states have acts binding the third person as well 
as the master.) The same public policy which condemns 
profit by insurance carrier or master condemns profit 
by a wrongdoer. 
The excess remains, not necessarily in every case-
perhaps not in this one; perhaps not in the case at bar, 
because the compensation awarded was limited to ap-
proximately $2500. In some cases like the Parramore 
case, one feature of which was presented by the writer 
of this brief acting as counsel for the Cudahy Packing 
Company, the damages, if any had been recovered, might 
well have been $10,000 or more, whereas, the compensa-
tion which had been awarded by the Industrial Commis-
sion of this state was approximately $5250, because that 
amount was the maximum that could under the law be 
awarded by the Industrial Commission. 
Justice does not permit the excess to be obtained 
and kept by either the master or the insurance carrier, 
nor does it permit that excess to be retained and kept 
by the wrongdoer. By verdict and judgment the determ-
ination may be that the dependents of the deceased serv-
ant have sustained a loss because of the wrongful killing 
in a sum equal not only to the compensation award but 
greatly in excess thereof. To pay such excess, less 
the reasonable expenses of the action, to the dependents 
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gratuity. By these means outlined in the statute the 
dependents get only the amount of their loss. It is 
submitted that they should not get less. 
Why General Assignability Should not be Permitted: 
These \Y orkmen 's Compensation Acts were designed 
primarily for the protection of those who labor and 
their dependents. To secure their protection and the 
protection of the public in g·eneral there should not be 
adopted e\en by a legislature, let alone by judicial con-
struction, unless such construction is required, any system 
that will encourage or promote a traffic in these rights 
protected by this Act. If the door is opened ''completely 
to general assignability,'' the compensation itself may 
be used for purposes of speculation in the outcome of 
personal injury suits. The law should never open its 
doors to such an extent as to create opportunities for 
fraud or legalized chicanery, and one of the evils that 
caused the enactment of "\V orkmen 's Compensation Acts 
was the somewhat general belief that the prosecution 
of the personal injury suit had become analogous to 
what is called a ''racket. '' 
By these observations the writer of this brief does 
not intend to cast the slightest reflection upon the coun-
sel who represent the plaintiffs in the case at bar, nor 
does he intend to refer to any person in particular. 
He has no knowledge of the contract between the instu-
ance company and the plaintiffs in the case at bar. 
He does submit, however, that before assignments are 
permitted by any statute, such assignments should be 
submitted to the Industrial Commission and allowed to 
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function only with its approval. These observations are 
made merely for the purpose of suggesting that there 
still exist sound reasons for the rules of law that prohibit 
assignability. Man has not yet attained unto Nirvana. 
The Statutes Requires Full Payment of Compensa-
tion Award: Taking this language from one of the 
opinions, ''allegations must be contained in the complaint 
showing that the insurer has performed those conditions 
precedent to obtaining title to the cause of action" 
as absolutely sound, the conclusion must follow that 
the insurance carrier must prove that it has fully paid 
the award before the insurance carrier can become 
veste<;l with the right to recover damages from the 
wrongdoer. This right to recover damages is in the 
language of the Ohio Court, used with reference to the 
death action," a bird in the bush"; it is in an embryonic 
and inchoate state, and that condition continues until 
the insurance carrier has paid the amount of the com-
pensation award. 
The words "having paid the compensation" must 
mean payment in full; otherwise such words mean '' ob-
ligated to pay" or "liable to pay," and mean nothing 
so far as payment is concerned. (Many states have 
statutes using the words "liable to pay.") If the words 
''having paid the compensation'' mean nothing more 
than ''liable to pay'' so far as payment is concerned, 
then such words mean nothing. Such a construction 
eliminates from the statute the words "having paid the 
compensation.'' To strike them from the statute is a legis-
lative function. To give them force suspends the "birth" 
of the action in this case for a period of six years from 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
29 
the date of Johanson's death, June 3, 1938. To say that 
these words mean ''payment on account,'' as one of the 
opinions in this case seems to indicate, is only in a slight 
degree less objectionable from a judicial standpoint than 
to ignore the element of payment entirely. 
''Payment is the extinguishment of the 
claim.'' 
Binford vs. Adams, 104 Ind. 41; 3 N. E. 753 (1885). 
''Prima facie the word 'paid' indicates that 
the obligation has been satisfied and the demand 
extinguished. '' 
Lynds vs. Van V alkenburgh, 77 Kan. 24; 93 Pac. 615 
(1908). 
For anyone to assert, as the plaintiffs did in their 
brief, that the compensation has been paid (appellants' 
brief, P. 13.) is to ignore the complaint. Such an asser-
tion is at war with the award of the Commission, a certi-
fied copy of which is hereto attached. Part payment is 
not payment. To be liable for payment is one thing, 
whereas, actual payment is another. In cases where the 
periodic payments required by the award extend ouf 
over a longer period, it is true that the "birth" of the 
action is long delayed. 
But, as was said by the lllinois Supreme Court, 308 
Ill. 322; 138 N. E. 658, this dilemma, if one there is, is 
one created by the legislature and ''the remedy lies with 
the legislature. We do not see how we can give the 
statute the construction contended for by appellant with-
out resorting to legislation ourselves.'' 
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It is not unreasonable to believe that the Utah legis-
lature was making an effort at a legislative recognition 
of the principle of equitable subrogation, which generally 
requires full payment before there can come about any 
subrogation. (182 Cal. 140; 187 Pac. 735 (1920). In any 
event, upon full payment, and not until then, the insur-
ance carrier became vested with the right to recover 
against the third person, the tort-feasor. How that 
cause can be assignable before it comes into existence, 
or how its assignment can accelerate its "birth" is not 
susceptible of rational explanation. (275 Fed. 333.) 
If ''it is payment of the award that gives birth 
to the carrier's rights," then without the payment of 
that award the carrier would have no rights either to 
enforce or assign. If this is a suit to recover "property 
-money-expenditure and not in tort," then indeed has 
il discovery been made of a principle hitherto unknown, 
except perhaps in the bayou of Louisiana. 
Foster Co. Ltd. vs. Knight Bros., 152 La. 596; 
93 So. 913 (1922). 
''An employer upon paying compensation for 
injuries to an employe sustained through the fault 
and negligence of a third person has two causes 
of action, one by way of subrogation and on behalf 
of the employe under Workmen's Compensation 
Law, Sec. 7, and the other for indemnification 
as on implied or quasi contract for reimburse-
ment for the money it was compelled to pay on 
account of the third person's fault." (Par. 2 
syllabi.) 
It was also held that the cause of action for indemnifi-
cation was contractual in character and existed inde-
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pendent of statute. It turned out in this Foster case 
that the action for the reimbursement of the money paid 
because of the fault of the defendant was not barred by 
the Louisiana statute of limitations, but in and so far as 
the demand exceeded the sum alleged to have been paid 
by plaintiffs, it was barred by the statute of limitations. 
This case leads to the inquiry relative to the common 
counts as they existed at common law and as they are 
still used in many states, including Utah. There were 
four at common law, all growing out of the action of 
assumpsit. That which came to be called, "indebitatus 
assumpsit'' absorbed quantum meruit and quantum 
Yalebat, leaving only what is called our action on an 
account stated remaining. To maintain assumpsit it is 
necessary that there should be a contract, either express 
or implied. There is special assumpsit and there is 
general assumpsit. To state a case in special assumpsit 
one of the prime essentials is a promise made by the 
defenda~ In general assumpsit, in the early part of 
the si&teerith century it was held that a promise to pay 
might be inferred from the fact that the defendant had 
been enriched or benefited. This kind of assumpsit was 
nothing more or less than the old action of debt which 
had existed for centuries prior to the Statute of West-
minster, 1285. It was the emolument of one party at the 
expense of the other, and from this emolument the law 
implied a promise, and this promise was nothing but 
a remedial fiction. 
Keigwin Cases Common Law Pleading, P. 190. 
Now the question has been decided time and again 
about waiving a tort and suing in assumpsit. If A 
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should take B 's automobile and sell it, B could waiv~ 
the conversion and sue for money had and received an( 
recover the price which the wrongdoer obtained for thE 
automobile. This upon the theory that A had been un· 
justly enriched to the extent of the amount of money tha1 
he received for the automobile which he originally con-
verted. If A received money from B the law would 
imply a promise on his part to repay the money s<J 
received because he was unjustly enriched. If he received 
goods and chattels from B, he was unjustly enriched to 
the extent of their value. If at his request B paid out 
money on his account, he was unjustly enriched to the 
extent of the money paid out, but it is not the law that 
a right of action in contract can be created by waiving 
a tort, such as negligent injury or killing of a servant. 
''You cannot obtain an implied promise from a duty to 
pay damages.'' The implied or fictional promise comes 
only from unjust enrichment of the defendant. 
Bigby vs. United States, 188 U. S. 400; 47 L. Ed. 
519 (1903). 
Bigby brought suit in the Court of Claims to recover 
damages sustained by him from the negligent manage-
ment of an elevator in a public building. The Court of 
Claims had jurisdiction of claims founded upon contract, 
express or implied, with the government, or for damag-
es ''in cases not sounding in tort.'' To make his case one 
of contract the plaintiff alleged that he had entered the 
elevator at the request of the government's agent ana 
that thereupon the defendant entered into an implied 
contract whereby, for a valuable consideration, it agreed 
to manage the elevator with due care and to carry the 
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plaintiff safely. On demurrer to the petition it was held 
that it did not state a case within the jurisdiction of the 
Court, but one essentially in tort. 
Mr. Justice Harlan, speaking for a unanimous court, 
said among other things : 
''Causing harm by negligence is a tort. One 
of the definitions of a tort is an act or omission 
causing harm which the person so acting or omit-
ting did not intend to cause, but might and should 
with due diligence have foreseen and prevented.'' 
Pollock on Torts, 1, 19. 
And again he said: 
''It is a case sounding in tort because it had 
its origin in and is founded on the wrongful and 
negligent act of the elevator manager. There is 
in it no element of contract as between the 
plaintiff and the government.'' 
Justice Harlan quoted from the case of Cooper vs. 
Cooper, 147 Mass. 370; 17 N. E. 892, 894 (1888). In 
this Cooper case a man falsely pretending that he was 
unmarried, induced the plaintiff to marry him and live 
with him as his wife. After this man's death the plaintiff 
discovered that at the time of his pretended marriage to 
her he had a wife still living and not divorced. She 
sued Cooper's estate to recover for services as his 
housekeeper. 
The Massachusetts Court said: 
"The obligation to make recompense for the 
injury done by the tort was imposed by law and 
could be enforced only in an action of tort. It 
was not a debt or duty upon which the law raised 
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a promise which would support an action of 
contract.'' 
The Louisiana case, holding that as to the compensa-
tion paid by the employer that party had a cause of action 
upon an implied contract, independent of statute, for 
indemnification at the hands of the defendant if the 
injury was caused by the latter's negligence, cannot have 
any foundation as law in any other state except possibly 
Louisiana. The publication of such an opinion by any 
court carries its own punishment. 
If the Court could lawfully imply a promise on the 
part of the wrongdoer to reimburse the master or the 
insurance carrier for money paid out to the servant, or 
his dependents in case of death, to satisfy the award of 
compensation, then with greater reason could a promise 
be implied on the part of the wrongdoer to pay the amount 
of loss which the servant or his dependents sustained 
by reason of the tort. It may be said that neither the 
injured servant nor his dependents in case of death had 
any express agreement with the tort-feasor, but neither 
did the insurance carrier or the master have any agree-
ment with the tort-feasor. Servants or their surviving 
dependents ought to be entitled to an equal protection 
along with masters and insurance carriers, and then 
why should this protection be confined to servants, de-
pendents, masters or insurance carriers' Having opened 
the door to fiction on the theory of unjust enrichment 
(Slade's Case, 1602), why not open it completely to a 
general fiction' Why not substitute ''unjust loss'' for 
''unjust enrichment''' Why not imply a promise to 
pay damages resulting from tort as against every tort-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
35 
feasor! Under such an extension of the doctrine of 
implied promise, contracts will no longer rest upon agree-
ment or consent except as every person impliedly agrees 
not to violate the duties or obligations imposed upon him 
by law. ''Let us take heart'' and open the door com-
pletely to the theory of social contract. 
It is Fundamental Law that subrogation cannot take 
place until the payment of the whole debt or obligation. 
Columbia Finance & Trust Co. vs. Railway Co., 
60 Fed. 794 (6 C. C. A.; 1894). 
In the course of his opinion Circuit Judge Lurton 
said: 
''The equity of subrogation does not arise 
from the mere obligation to pay. It springs alone 
from payment. The liability of the surety for the 
remainder of the debt continued as well after as 
before such payment, and until the entire debt 
is paid the surety has no such equity as will 
entitle him to the aid of a court of equity.'' 
(Italics inserted.) 
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. vs. Centrapo-
lis Bank, 17 Fed. (2d) 913; 53 A. L. R. 295 
(1927). 
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. vs. Union 
Bank & Trust Co., 228 Fed. 448 ( 6 C. C. A. ; 
1915). 
A reading of these cases will make clear that there 
is a real subrogation and what is sometimes called a 
"conventional" subrogation, i. e. a right resting upon 
contract. 
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Bingham vs. Walker Bros., Bankers, 75 Utah, 149; 
283 Pac. 1055 (1930). 
In this case this Court made a clear distinction 
between legal subrogation, which is not the direct result 
of an agreement, and conventional subrogation, which 
depends upon a contract. This Court said : 
''Where the person who pays the debt of 
another stands in the situation of a surety, or is 
compelled to pay to protect his own right or 
property, the right of subrogation is a conse-
quence which equity attaches to such a condition, 
and the right of subrogation under such circum-
stances is not a direct result of an agreement. 
This, in law, is termed 'legal subrogation.' In 
addition to the principle of legal subrogation, 
there exists another principle termed 'conven-
tional subrogation,' which occurs where the one 
who is under no obligation to make the payment, 
and who has no right or interest to protect, pays 
the debt of another under an agreement, express 
or implied, that he will be subrogated to rights 
of the debtor or creditor.'' 
And again: 
''Conventional subrogation depends upon a 
contract.'' 
If subrogation is brought about directly through a 
contract or agreement, then it is an assignment, and the 
manner in which the assignee shall act is controlled by 
the terms of the agreement. If, however, there is a real 
subrogation, i. e. one independent of contract, then it is 
the payment of the obligation, or, as Mr. Justice Pratt 
says in his opinion, "it is the payment of the award that 
gives birth to the carrier's rights.'' 
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thing it has suffered no loss and acquired no right or 
equity. If it has paid only a part and not all, then to 
allow it an action for the part paid violates the principle 
forbidding the splitting of causes of action. If the in-
surance carrier has paid only in part and is allowed to 
recover all, then the Salt Company in this case carrying 
the primary liability for master's compensation might 
have a right to complain, or perhaps the dependents of 
the deceased servant might be injured. If this action 
is generally assignable the insurance carrier then may 
sell it to persons even beyond the jurisdiction of the 
courts of Utah. General assignment and reassignment 
may ultimately nullify the fundamental purposes of the 
Workmen's Compensation Act. 217 N.Y. S. 277. 
The insurance carrier ''having paid the compensa-
t,ion" becomes a subrogee and not an assignee. 
City of New Orleans vs. Whitney, 138 U. S. 595; 
34 L. Ed. 1102 (1890). 
In this case Mr. Justice Bradley, rendering the opin-
ion of the court, said : 
''Subrogation is not assignment'. The most 
that can be said is that the subrogated creditor by 
operation of law represents the person to whose 
right he is subrogated.'' 
Orange Ice, Light & Water Co. vs. Texas Compensa-
tion Ins. Co., 278 Fed. 8 ( 5 C. C. A. ; 1922). 
The Texas Compensation Insurance Company a 
corporation and therefore a citizen of Delaware, brought 
suit against the Orange Ice, Light & Power Company 
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and Yellow Pine Paper Mill Company, each a citizen of 
Texas, as defendants, to recover for injuries inflicted 
on Jesse L. Dowdell and for his death resulting there-
from under the provisions of the Texas Workmen's 
Compensation law. The section of the Texas statute 
was similar to Section 42-1-58 of the U~ah statute. In 
some respects, however, it was essentially different. The 
servant, after injury and before his death, elected to 
receive compensation. After his death the servant's 
widow claimed compensation. The cause of action of 
the servant for pain and suffering endured by him prior 
to his death survived to the widow, and then she had a 
new and independent cause of action for death by virtue 
of the death statute of Texas. Under the Texas Compen-
sation statute the insurance carrier, by paying the amount 
of compensation, became subrogated to the rights of the 
servant and the rights of the servant's widow. The 
insurance carrier filed a petition seeking to recover 
$10,000 for the pain and suffering endured by the injured 
man and $40,000 for and on account of his death. The 
trial resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff for $5000 for 
the pain and suffering and $7000 for the death. Quota-
tion from the opinion : 
"The first point urged is that the United 
States court was without jurisdiction because, 
while the plaintiff is a citizen of Delaware and 
defendants citizens of Texas, Jesse L. Dowdell 
and Mrs. Ina Dowdell are to be considered for 
the purpose of jurisdiction as joint plaintiffs, and 
that at the time the original suit was filed they 
were citizens of Texas. We do not think this 
point is well taken. Here the plaintiff, because 
of payments made and contracts entered into, had 
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become pecuniarily interested in this cause of 
action. The statute of Texas had deprived the 
employe and his representatives, who elected to 
hold the insurance association of all right to 
institute an action against a wrongdoer. The right 
to institute suit was by the statute lodged in the 
association. It was subrog·ated to all rights of 
the employe and his representatives, is authorized 
to sue in its own name, with the right to reimburse 
itself all sums it had paid and its reasonable at-
torney's fee, as fixed by the court, and was ac-
countable only for any surplus then left to the 
legal beneficiary. The entire legal title to the 
cause of action was under this statute vested in 
the association primarily for its own security. 
This made it the sole party plaintiff on whose 
citizenship the jurisdiction depended. As has 
been said by the Supreme Court of the United 
States.'' (Italics inserted.) 
And then follows the above quotation from the 
opinion of ~Ir. Justice Bradley in the Gaines case. 
The Circuit Court of Appeals of the Fifth Circuit 
continues: 
''Though other persons may be interested in 
the recovery and named in the complaint as usees, 
they are not parties to the action and their citizen-
ship is not to be considered in determining juris-
diction, where the legal title is vested in a party 
with a substantial interest. 
This decision and the statutes of the State of Texas 
will hold the intense interest of anyone interested in the 
law. 
Staples vs. Central Surety & Ins. Corporation, 
62 Fed. (2d) 650 (10 C. C. A. 1921). 
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In reading this case it must be remembered that 
the rights and liabilities arise in the State of Oklahoma 
where actions for injuries have been made to survive 
by express statute since the year 1909, and where the 
subrogee master or insurance carrier is limited in right 
of recovery of damages against the third person to the 
amount paid in satisfying the compensation award. 
Ridley vs. United Sash & Door Co., 98 Okla. 80; 
224 Pac. 351 (1924). 
As Mr. Justice Pratt said: 
"They" (referring to cases) "must be read 
in the light of the statutes of the state from which 
they are taken.'' 
Recurring to the Staples case and to the opinion 
written by Mr. District Judge Pollock, sitting as a 
circuit judge, it appears that one Clyde J. Goulger, a 
servant of an employer named Bush, was injured by a 
boiler explosion caused by Staples and others. Goulger 
made claim for compensation from his employer Bush 
under the Workmen's Compensation law of Oklahoma 
and received an award of $2230.50. The Central Surety 
& Ins. Company, pursuant to its contract of insurance 
with Bush, the employer, paid the amount awarded and 
in addition thereto paid out the further sum of $1161.50 
on account of medical aid and hospital expenses for 
Goulger as a result of his injuries, and then it paid out 
legal expenses amounting to $200 in connection with 
Goulger 's claim. The total expenditure was $3592. The 
insurance carrier was subrogated to Bush's rights 
against Staples, et al. Among others this question 
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arose: \Y as the insurance carrier 1n this Staples case 
an assignee 1 J udg·e Pollock said : 
"The determination of this issue turns upon 
the question of whether or not the cause of action 
alleged by the Central Surety and Insurance 
Corporation is an assigned one within the meaning 
of Section 24 ( 1) of the Judicial Code. We think 
not. Subrogation is not assignment within the 
meaning of that section." (Citing authorities.) 
The Court held that the insurance carrier received 
nothing by reason of the consent of Bush, the employer, 
and that the right of subrogation did not rest upon any 
relation of contract or privity, but it rested upon, in fact 
derived its existence from, the law. For these reasons 
the insurance carrier was not an assignee. 
Lynds vs. Van V alkenburgh, 77 Kan. 24; 93 Pac. 
615 (1908). 
It is not believed that any case can be found contain-
ing a more satisfactory explanation of the difference 
between an assignment and subrogation. This explana-
tion is quoted by the Kansas Court from the case of 
Gatewood vs. Gatewood, 75 Va. 407, 410. The Court also 
cites Binford vs. Adams, 104 Ind. 41; 3 N. E. 753 (1885). 
This Indiana case has to do with the legal effect of the 
payment of a promissory note by a third person having 
no interest to protect, holding that such a payment by 
such a person extinguishes the debt. Equity will subro-
gate the third person who pays if such person has an 
interest to protect by payment, but equity will not subro-
gate the third person who pays and who has no interest 
in the matter to protect. Such third person must have 
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a contract whereby the rights of the maker of the note 
are transferred to the third person who pays the amount 
thereof. 
No better statement of the distinction can be made 
than to quote from the Kansas case as it quoted from the 
Virginia case. ( 93 Pac. 620.) 
''Subrogation and equitable assignment are 
acts of the law as distinguished from assignment 
by acts of parties. 'We must be careful to dis-
tinguish between an assignment of the mortgage 
debt and a mere right of subrogation to the lien 
of the mortgage creditor. Assignment is the act 
of the parties, and depends generally upon inten-
tion. Where the nature of the transaction is such 
as imports a payment of the debt and a consequent 
discharge of the mortgage, there can, of course, 
be no assignment, for the lien of the mortgage is 
extinguished by the payment. A mortgage 
creditor cannot be compelled to assign the debt 
and mortgage upon receiving payment. All that 
he can be required to do is to give an acquittance 
and release. The exception to this rule, if it 
can be so termed, is found in those cases where 
the party making the payment occupies the posi-
tion of surety to the debt, or is in some way per-
sonally bound for its payment. Such a person 
may, in equity require an assignment or transfer, 
not only of the mortgage itself, but of all the 
securities held by the creditor, for his protection 
and indemnity, and, although no such assignment 
or transfer is actually made, a court of equity 
will treat it as having been done. But if the party 
making the payment does not occupy the position 
of surety for the debt, as a general rule he cannot 
claim to be entitled as assignee unless by agree-
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ment with the creditor. s~tbrogation is, how-
ever, a rcry different thing from an assignment. 
It is the act of the law, and the creature of a 
court of equity, dependiug not upon contract, but 
upon the priuciples of equity and justice. It pre-
supposes an actual payment and satisfaction of 
the debt secured by the mortgage. But, although 
the debt is paid and satisfied, a court of equity 
will keep alive the lien for the benefit of the party 
who made the payment, provided he as security 
for the debt has such an interest in the land as 
entitles him to the benefit of the security given 
for its payment.'' (Italics ours.) 
(It will be noticed that Mr. Justice McDonough in 
his dissenting opinion said, "This right was transferred 
by operation of law to the insurance carrier upon the 
dependents' election to take compensation and the pay-
ment thereof.") 
In the case at the bar it is most earnestly submitted 
that· this Court failed to appreciate the distinction be-
tween "legal subrogation" on the one hand and" conven-
tional subrogation" on the other; the act of the law on 
one side and the act of the parties on the other. 
Bingham vs. Walker Bros., Bankers, 75 Utah, 149; 
283 Pac. 1055 (1929). 
In this Bingham case there was involved the right of 
the defendant to be subrogated to the rights and remedies 
of the :.McMillan heirs in reference to a debt of $4500 
which was paid by the defendant to said McMillan heirs. 
The Trial Court had denied the right of subrogation and 
this Court was called upon to review the ruling of the 
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Trial Court. In its opinion the Court stated the question 
involved: 
''Do the facts in the instant case bring the 
defendant or its intestate within the principle 
upon which the doctrine of equitable assignment 
by subrogation, either legal or conventional, 
rests~,, 
The Court made a clear distinction between ''legal 
subrogation'' and ''conventional subrogation,'' stating 
(quoting Par. 7 of syllabi): 
'' 'Legal subrogation' results where person 
pays debt of another by reason of relation of 
surety or because compelled to pay debt to protect 
his own rights of property and not as direct result 
of an agreement." (Italics inserted.) 
"Legal subrogation" rests on compulsion; "conven-
tional subrogation'' is the direct result of consent or 
agreement. 
Starkweather vs. Cleveland Surety Co., 22 Fed. Cas. 
1091, Case No. 13308 (1870). 
In this Starkweather case the insured had become 
bankrupt. An assignee had been appointed and property 
had been destroyed by fire. The insurance company 
contended that there could be no recovery by the assignee 
in bankruptcy because the fire insurance policy read, 
"If the title to the property is transferred or changed, 
this policy shall be void, and if without the written 
consent of the company this policy shall be assigned, it 
shall be void. ' ' 
The direct question present for adjudication was: 
Is the assignment of the register in bankruptcy to the 
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assignee both of the policy and of the property insured 
a Yiolation of the above provisions quoted from the 
policy, and does that assignment exonerate the company 
from liability? In rendering its opinion the Court did 
not use the terms ''legal'' and ''conventional'' but it 
classified assignments as of two kinds, one in fact and 
one in law. Quoting from the opinion: 
''An assignee in fact is one to whom an as-
signment has been made in fact by the party hav-
ing a right to assign. An assignee in law is one 
in whom the law vests the right and control in 
the property.'' 
It appeared that under the bankrupt law of England 
the Commissioners of Bankruptcy were required to per-
form certain statutory powers. In this Starkweather 
case the Federal Judge quoted Lord Ellen borough as 
follows: 
''An assignment by the Commissioners in 
Bankruptcy is the execution of a statutory power 
given them for a particular purpose, viz: the pay-
ment of the bankrupt's debts. Nothing passes 
from them or nothing ever vested in them. What-
ever passes, passes by force of the statute and 
for the purpose of effecting the object of the 
statute.'' 
The Starkweather case also contains a quotation 
from Lord Kenyon in passing upon the terms of a lease 
which contained a covenant that the lessee ''should not 
set over, assign, transfer or in any manner dispose of 
the lease without the written consent of the lessor.'' 
The lessee confessed judgment and upon execution issued 
thereon the lease was sold. Lord Kenyon said : 
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''I adopt the distinction between these acts 
which the party does voluntarily, and those that 
pass in invitum. Judgment in contemplation of 
law, always passes in invitum, and, therefore, 
there is no breach.'' 
The discussion has now advanced to a point where 
a distinction should be pointed out between the Stark-
weather case and the cases cited therein. The bankrupt 
owned the property insured and owned the policies of 
insurance. The lessees in the case decided by Lord 
Kenyon owned the lease. They had title vested in them 
to the property which was taken from them by operation 
of law. 
In the case at bar the dependents of Johanson never 
had any title in the right to recover from the third person 
• for the wrongful death of the deceased. Section 42-1-58 
provided two remedies : (a) and ( z). (These letters have 
been adopted because they are the first and the last, 
a long way apart.) The dependents had the first choice 
to take one and only one. They took remedy (a) or 
compensation against the master. The master or the 
insurance carrier, when it had paid the compensation, 
took remedy ( z), viz: the right to recover from the 
third person for wrongfully killing Robert Johanson, 
the deceased whose death is involved herein. No trans-
fer was made. The statute gave one remedy, (a), to 
the dependents and the other, an entirely different 
remedy, (z), to the insurance carrier. 
State Brewing Co. vs. Cleveland & St. Louis Ry. Co., 
275 Fed. 330 (7 C. C. A.; 1921). 
In this case 1\{r. Circuit Judge Baker, speaking for 
a divided court, among other things said: 
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"Unless in some other portion of the Act 
surh right of action is revived it must remain 
forever dead; and it is contrary to rational 
thought to say that a suit can be maintained upon 
the assignment of a non-existent thing." (P. 333.) 
(Italics ours.) 
The dhision between the majority and minority of 
the court did not dispute the self-evident truth above 
quoted. 
The dependents, by their election, became vested 
with the award of compensation. That was their right, 
and when they made this election those dependents were 
excluded from every other right under the statute, and 
never had any other right under the statute. The statute 
did not make an assignment. The dependents did not 
make one. The statute did not provide for an assign-
ment even to the insurance carrier. One may say that 
it had the same effect as an assignment, but one may 
not say that such effect came about by assignment. 
The right of the insurance carrier did not result 
from contract nor did it pass through, either by opera-
tion of law or by contract, the dependents of Johanson. 
It was a right directly vested in the insurance carrier 
by the plain terms of the statute, and not otherwise. The 
mere fact that the measure of damages to be applied to 
the carrier's action may be on the one hand the amount 
of compensation paid by the insurance carrier, or on the 
other the amount of damages which the dependents 
might have recovered had there been no election by them 
to take compensation, does not and cannot alter the fact 
that the insurance carrier sues in its own right and 
recovers "for itself" (opinion of Mr. Justice Pratt.) 
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Mr. Justice Pratt said, "having accepted compensation 
they'' (the dependents) ''are not permitted to sue for 
damages for the death of their son.'' And again, ''the 
insurance carrier may, if it sees fit, refrain from en-
forcing the rights it acquired by subrogation, in which 
event the dependents-plaintiffs herein-have no com-
plaint. They may not insist that the carrier enforces its 
rights.'' 
Why, if not because they have no rights in the action,¥ 
They declined to take any rights in that action. The fact, 
if it be a fact, that they may share in the recovery when 
once that recovery is obtained, does not give them any 
rights in the action. It does not make them either real 
parties in interest or parties at all. 
In the Staples case, supra, where the insurance car-
rier sued only for the amount it was required to pay out 
by reason of the negligence of Staples, Judge Pollock 
said: 
''The compensation law of Oklahoma has 
nothing to do with the case except as it fixed a 
liability upon Bush (the employer) for the negli-
gence of appellants. If an automobile belonging 
to Bush had been destroyed by the exploding 
boiler he or his insurance carrier could have re-
covered, and there is nothing in the compensation 
law to the contrary. Where the injury is to 
Bush's servant the compensation law required 
Bush to pay, but the financial loss to Bush or his 
insurance carrier is just as directly the result 
of the appellants' negligence as if its force had 
been spent on his automobile instead of his 
servant.'' 
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(It must be remembered that in this Staples case 
the court is enforcing the law of Oklahoma where causes 
of action for personal injuries have long survived.) 
In closing the argument in support of Contention 
Xo. 1 it is submitted that this Court erred in holding: 
First: That Section 42-1-58, either in terms or in 
effect, transferred any rights from the dependents to 
the insurance carrier, or for that matter transferred 
any rights at all. 
Second: That because Section 42-1-58 had the ulti-
mate effect of an assignment of the right of action to 
the insurance carrier, such ultimate effect in granting 
rights to the insurance carrier ''opened the door com-
pletely to general assignability." (Quotation from Mr. 
Justice Wolfe's opinion.) (Thi~ ruling of this one 
justice has the following unsound results: (a) because 
the insurance carrier is a subrogee it is also an assignee 
in fact; (b) because the law subrogates the insurance 
carrier into rights, such insurance carrier not only 
becomes an assignee in fact but this subrogation has the 
same legal effect as a statute providing for general 
assignability; (c) the statute by this ruling in effect 
amends the survivorship statute of Utah, because general 
assignability of the right of action transforms the 
character of the action from that of a personal right 
into one of property, i. e. one capable of inheritance.) 
It is submitted that the right of the insurance carrier 
was not made assignable by the statute, and that unless 
a statute authorized it such right may not be assigned 
or "reassigned" by that carrier. 
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CONTENTION NO. 2 
THE STATUTORY RIGHT TO RECOVER DAMAGES 
FROM THE DEFENDANT IS STRICTLY PER-
SONAL IN ITS NATURE. IT IS NOT A PROPERTY 
RIGHT. 
If the plaintiffs had alleged a request on the part 
of the defendant made to the London Guarantee & Acci-
dent Company, Ltd., to pay the compensation awarded 
against the Salt Company, and such insurance carrier 
had paid that award pursuant to said request, then there 
would have been a sound basis for implying a promise 
on the part of the defendant to reimburse the insurance 
carrier for the amount that it had paid out pursuant to 
such request. The action to recover the money paid 
out would be classified as ex contractu. It would have 
survived the death of either a plaintiff or a defendant. 
On the death of either or both of such parties it would 
be an asset in favor of the estate of the party who paid 
the money or a liability against the estate of the party 
at whose request the money was paid out. No such 
request is alleged in the complaint, nor is there any al-
legation of either an express or implied promise on the 
part of the defendant to reimburse the insurance carrier. 
A cause of action for the destruction of property 
for which an insurance company must pay under its 
policy can be the subject of subrogation without the aid 
of statute and without any assignment. If A owns an 
automobile which he has insured for its full value stipu-
lated at $2000, and B negligently destroys that automo-
bile so that it is a total loss, the insurance carrier is then 
compelled to pay that loss as it was stipulated in the 
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policy. Upon payment the insurance carrier is subro-
gated without any statute and without any assignment, 
and that insurance carrier may bring an action in its 
own name against B to recoYer from him as a tort-feasor, 
not the amount the insurance carrier paid but the value 
of the automobile at the time of the loss. B, the tort-
feasor, was not a party to the contract of insurance made 
by A with the insurance carrier, and for that reason such 
contract neither affects nor fixes his liability. The lia-
bility of B is delictual and not contractual in character. 
The insurance company's right to recover as a subrogee 
against B is a property right, because under Sections 
102-11-6 and 102-11-7 of the Probate Code of Utah "any 
person or his personal representatiYes may maintain 
an action against the executor or administrator of any 
testator or intestate who in his lifetime has wasted, des-
troyed, taken or carried away or converted to his own 
use the goods or chattels of any such person or committed 
any trespass on the real estate of such person.'' 
B destroyed the chattel of A and if B negligently 
or wrongfully committed that act of destruction, then 
either he or his estate will be liable in an action sounding 
in tort, not in contract. B, the tort-feasor, was not in 
any wise enriched or benefited by his destruction of A's 
automobile, and for that reason no promise on his part to 
pay the damages could be implied. If B had converted 
the automobile to his own use instead of destroying it, 
his tort could have been waived by the owner of the 
automobile, or his subrogee, the insurance carrier, and 
an action ex contractu could have been maintained against 
B. This action ex contractu would be founded upon the 
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enrichment which had inured to B by reason of his wrong-
ful act, but by the destruction of the automobile this 
tort-feasor acquired nothing by his wrongful act. The 
law compels him to atone for his tort, but such liability 
to pay damages to A is essentially different from the 
obligation to return the automobile to its owner. The 
real injury sustained by A was a tort, and the facts as 
assumed do not connect it with any contract relations 
between A and B or between Band the insurance carrier, 
because no such contract relations exist. 
It is impossible to imply a tacit agreement unless 
you can imply a promise to pay damages for a tort. 
Let it be assumed that A's servant X was killed in 
the same accident and B 's negligence was the sole cause 
of the accident. At common law A, the master, had no 
civil remedy against B, the tort-feasor, because no action 
could be maintained for the death of a human being 
caused by the wrongful act or negl~gence of another or 
for damage suffered by any person by reason of such 
death. The question of the survivorship of the action 
to the servant's representatives would be irrelevant 
because there was no action to survive. 
Section 104-3-11, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, 
provides a remedy to the heirs of X or X 's personal 
representative for the benefit of the heirs of X. This 
section of the Utah statute is a part of the code of Civil 
Procedure and applies only to the death of adults, 
(another for minors) and excepts from its operation 
cases provided for in Chapter 1 of Title 42. This Section 
104-3-11 does not impose any liability on anyone except 
the wrongdoer. (Of course the doctrine of respondeat 
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superior is made to work against the wrongdoer.) 
Without any other statute than Section 104-3-11, 
neither the Royal Crystal Salt Company in the case 
at bar nor its insurance carrier would have been in any 
sense liable to the heirs or dependents of the deceased 
serYant, because no one claims that either the master 
or the insurance carrier was at fault. The liability of 
the master and its insurance carrier to the dependent 
resulted from the provisions of the Workmen's Com-
pensation Act. The Royal Crystal Salt Company, the 
employer, was required to pay compensation by reason 
of the provisions of that Act, and the election of the 
dependents, and the insurance company was compelled 
to pay that liability because of the provisions of its 
insurance contract with the Royal Crystal Salt Company. 
Without the aid of a statute changing the common law 
and otherwise providing, neither the Salt Company nor 
the insurance carrier would have had any remedy against 
the person whose wrongful act caused the death of the 
servant. 
Admiralty Commissioners vs. Steamship America, 
A. C. 38 Ann. Cas. 1917B, 877 ( 1917). 
Mobile Life Ins. Co. vs. Brame, 95 U. S. 754; 
24 L. Ed. 580. 
These cases and others have already been discusse<\ 
in this brief. They are not in conflict with the following 
cases: 
Travelers' Ins. Co. vs. Great Lakes Engineering Co., 
184 Fed. 426, 36 L. R. A. (N. S.) 60 (6 C. C. A.; 
1911). 
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Staples vs. Central Surety & Ins. Corp., 62 Fed. (2d) 
650 (10 C. C. A.; 1932). 
Take the Travelers' case first, for that is .the one 
where the death of Leinhart was involved. The insurance 
company in its petition sought to recover the sum of 
$2855, itemized as follows: 
Money paid out : 
For the wrongful death of 
Joseph Leinhart --------------------------------------$2750 
Court costs ------------------------------------------------------ 15 
For injury to Edward Wund ------------------------ 75 
Court costs ------------------------------------------------------ 15 
Total ----------------------------------------------------------$2855 
The plaintiff alleged as a ground of recovery that 
the death of Leinhart and the injury of Wund were 
caused by the negligence of the Engineering Company 
while it was installing a refrigerating machine and a 
steam engine in the place of business of the Herancourt 
Brewing Company. The deceased and injured person 
apove named were employees of the Brewing Company. 
The plaintiff was the insurance carrier of that Brewing 
Company. There was an express stipulation in its policy 
of insurance providing for the right of subrogation. 
The defendant contended that as to the death of 
Leinhart, the petition did not state facts sufficient to 
constitute a cause of action, and with the Leinhart item 
taken out, the jurisdictional amount, to wit: $2000, would 
not be involved and the Federal Court would have no 
jurisdiction. (The jurisdictional amount' of the Federal 
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Court was required to be in excess of $2000 up until 
1912.) The sole question involved in the case as reported 
could be stated in the language of the Court: 
.. \Yhether the insurer, by reason of a con-
tract of indemnity against employers' liability, 
such as exists here, can maintain an action against 
a third party whose negligence has caused liability 
to the insured employer for injuries resulting in 
the death of its employee." 
Circuit Judge Knappen of Sixth Circuit Court of 
Appeals, commented upon the Brame case and said: 
''the insurance contract there involved was not 
one of indemnity to those injured by the death, 
but was a wagering contract. The principle of 
subrogation could have no application to that 
case, because rights thereunder must have been 
asserted in the name of the insured, and what-
ever right of action he may have had abated with 
his death." (Italics ours.) 
He also ref erred to the decision from Connecticut 
involving the death of Dr. Beach, which he also said 
rested upon the same ground as the Brame case. 
Is this statement entirely accurate~ If the contract 
of insurance upon the life of either McLemore or Beach 
had been a wagering contract, then it would have been 
void as against public policy. No greater element of 
wager inhered in the policies of McLemore or Beach 
than that which inhered in the policy where Leinhart 
was involved. A wager policy is one in which the bene-
ficiary has no interest whatsoever in the subject matter 
covered by the insurance, whether it is life or property, 
but only an interest in its loss or destruction. 
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32 Corpus Juris, 1094. 
Steinbeck vs. Diepenbrock, 158 N.Y. 24; 52 N. E. 662 
70 Am. St. 424; 44 L. R. A. 417 (1898). 
(Opinion by Chief Justice Parker.) 
Then again, the right of the insurance company to 
recover as a subrogee for the wrongful death of Mc-
Lemore, of course, could not have been asserted in the 
name of McLemore. McLemore was dead and he had no 
right of action. None abated because none existed. It 
was his death that caused pecuniary loss to the insurance 
carrier. That carrier to recover from Brame was re-
quired to have an action in its own right by reason of 
Brame's wrongful act which resulted in the death of 
. McLemore; or as a subrogee of some person who had 
been given a right of recovery because of the wrongful 
death of McLemore by the Louisiana death statute. The 
court decided that the insurance company had no right 
of its own, even though that company had suffered a 
pecuniary loss of $7000 by reason of McLemore's death. 
Company had no right under death statute. 
Of course, it will readily occur to anyone who thinks 
about it that an insurance contract could be made against 
loss of earning power by reason of accident or death 
to cover a period of time stipulated in the policy while 
the insured might work, and the right of subrogation 
of the insurance carrier paying any loss occasioned by 
accident or death against anyone negligently causing 
such loss could be made a part of such contract. Unless 
the insurance policy provided for subrogation, it is sub-
mitted such right would not exist. 
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Connecticut ~Iutual Life Ins. Co. YS. New York, N.H. 
Ry. Co., ~5 Conn. ~65; 65 Am. Dec. 571 (1856). 
(Beach case. where right of subrogation is dis-
cussed.) 
Gatzweiler vs. :Milwaukee Ry. Co., 136 Wis. 34; 
116 N. \Y. 633; 18 L. R. A. (N. S.) 211 (1908). 
(See note, 65 Am. Dec. 629, where cases are collected, 
and note 18 L. R. A. (N. S.) 211.) 
The petition in the Travelers' case was held suffi-
cient in its facts because of the rule whereby an employer 
not in fault who has been compelled to pay damages to 
a third person for the negligence of his agent or employee 
may maintain an action over against agent or employee 
to recover what employer has been compelled to pay. 
After pointing out this rule, Judge Knapp en said: 
''The brewing company thus had, by virtue 
of its alleged relations with the engineering com-
pany, a right of action over against the latter for 
negligence on its part which caused legal damage 
to the brewing company. The injury to the brew-
ing company resulting from that negligence was 
direct and immediate.'' 
In the next paragraph of the opinion he said: 
"With respect to injuries not causing death, 
as in the case of W und, we apprehend this propo-
sition would not be questioned. With respect to 
the damage resulting from Leinhart 's death, the 
fact that Leinhart had no right of action is im-
material. There is no attempt to recover herein 
any right of his. The ground of the recovery 
sought is that the engineering company failed in 
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its primary and positive duty toward the brewing 
company, whereby the latter company sustained 
a loss. It can make no difference with its right 
of action over, that the original recovery against 
it belonged to one person rather than another,-
to the widow and children rather than to the 
representative of Leinhart's estate. Under the 
allegations of the petition, the negligence of the 
engineering company was the direct and sole 
cause of Leinhart's death, and thus of the damages 
suffered by the brewing company." (Would 
Leinhart 's contributory negligence be a defense n 
Judge Knappen pointed out in his statement of facts 
that the policy of insurance subrogated to the extent of 
its payment the insurance carrier to all rights of recovery 
by employer for loss by the assured. 
The subrogation in the Travelers' case was one 
where the insurance carrier obtained the rights of the 
Brewing Company by virtue of the contract of insurance 
made between the Insurance Company and the Brewing 
Company. To recover, the Insurance Company was re-
quired to prove, according to Judge Knappen's opinion, 
that Leinhart's death occurred through the negligence 
of the Engineering Company, and also the extent of the 
damages recoverable by his relatives on account of that 
death. (This is practically a quotation from the latter 
part of the court's opinion, and from it the inference is 
inevitable that the action against Engineering Company 
IS delictual and not contractual in character.) 
Take the Staples case from the Tenth Circuit. The 
insurance company paid out the full amount of the award, 
to wit: $2230.50, and in addition thereto the further 
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sum of $1161.50 on account of medical aid and hospital 
expenses incurred in treating the insured. The insurance 
carrier sought to recoYer from Staples the total of these 
two amounts, to wit: $3592, paid out pursuant to its 
contract of indemnity insurance. This contract contained 
a provision that in case of any payment under said con-
tract the insurance carrier should be subrogated to the 
extent of any such payment to all rights of recovery 
therefor vested by law in Bush or in any employee or his 
dependents, against persons, corporations, associations, 
or estates. Personal injury to one Gougler, an employee 
of Bush, was the occasion of the above payments. 
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, speaking by 
Judge Pollock, pointed out that upon the question of 
negligence no issue was raised on the appeal, and then 
said: 
"It is a well-recognized rule, supported by a 
great weight of authority, that, where one has 
been subjected to liability, and has suffered loss 
thereby, on account of the negligence or wrongful 
act of another, the one has a right of action against 
the other for indemnity.'' 
After reviewing certain cases he continued: 
"Upon this settled principle, it is clear that 
Bush, having been subjected to liability to his 
employee, Gougler, under the Compensation Law, 
as a result of the negligence of appellants, had a 
cause of action, in his own right, for indemnity 
against appellants, at common law entirely inde-
pendent of any provisions of the Compensation 
Law. And the appellee, having discharged Bush's 
liability to Gougler, pursuant to its contract of 
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insurance, is subrogated to Bush's right against 
appellants.'' 
And again: 
''The appellee does not sue for the unliquidat-
ed damages suffered by Gougler; it sues only for 
the amount it was required to pay out by reason 
of the negligence of appellants." (This is Okla-
homa law. See Ridley and other Okla. cases.) 
He finally says in substance that no inquiry need 
be made whether Gougler had any right to pursue his 
remedy against appellants, or whether such right had 
been abrogated by the Compensation Law of Oklahoma, 
stating: 
''The Compensation Law of Oklahoma has 
nothing to do with the case, except as it fixed a 
liability upon Bush for the negligence of the 
appellants.'' 
(The Compensation Law of Oklahoma did not fix 
any liability upon Bush, the employer, or anybody else, 
for the negligence of the appellants or anybody else. 
The negligence of Staples may have caused the injury 
to Gougler, but the liability of the employer under the 
Compensation Act arose merely from the injury, and 
that liability was fixed by applying the standards pre-
scribed by the Act itself, without the consideration of 
any element of fault or wrong on the part of anybody.) 
The last paragraph of Judge Pollock's opinion is 
interesting. He says : 
"If an automobile belonging to Bush had 
been destroyed by the exploding boiler, he or his 
insurance carrier could have recovered, and there 
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is nothing in the Compensation Law to the con-
trary. \\'here the injury is to Bush's servant, 
the Compensation Law required Bush to pay; 
but the financial loss to Bush or his insurance 
carrier is just as directly the result of appellants' 
negligence as if its force had been spent on his 
automobile instead of his servant.'' 
(Does Judge Pollock mean that in an action by the 
insurance carrier against a tort-feasor for negligently 
destroying an automobile the measure of damages could 
be determined by the amount the insurance carrier had 
been compelled under its contract of insurance to pay 
to the person who had owned the automobile at the time 
of its destruction? It is to be hoped that a proper 
construction of the language quoted is to the effect that 
the tort-feasor pays the full value of the thing destroyed 
by him as it might be determined in a case where he 
was a party, and no more than that value as it might 
be determined in such a case.) See also Grand Rapids 
Lumber Co. vs. Blair 190 Mich. 518; 157 N. W. 29 (1916). 
The purpose of the Compensation Act was that pay-
ments under it should be a partial substitute for wages 
that might have been earned by the employee had he 
not been injured or killed. To achieve these purposes 
the compensation awarded is paid in periodical install-
ments rather than in a lump sum. It takes a substantial 
showing to obtain a lump-sum-award. The right to these 
payments is a personal one either to the injured employee 
or to his dependents in case of death. It is well known 
that these unfortunate persons need protection not only 
as against strangers but even as against their own im-
providence. The right to compensation under that Act 
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and the right to recover damages from the tort-feasor 
are so different in character that in the absence of some 
statute applying the rule of subrogation that rule would 
be entirely inapplicable. 
Newark Paving Co. vs. Klotz, 85 N. J. L., 432; 91 
Atl. 41 (1914). 
In this case the Court said : 
''If the statutory compensations were sub-
ject to deductions by reason of payments made 
by a third person, the tort-feasor, to the person 
injured or to his dependents, in satisfaction of 
the liability for the tort, this object of the statute 
would be thwarted, and in effect the commutation 
to a lump sum would take place without any 
order of the court and at the will of the injured 
party or his representatives. If, on the other 
hand, the employer were allowed to recover of 
the tort-feasor by action in the name of the 
employe or his representative, he would be able 
to recover in advance of payments by him and at 
a time when the extent of his own liability could 
not be ascertained.'' 
Has the Compensation Act made the servant work-
ing in the course of his employment analogous to a ma-
chine used in the industry where the servant works, 
so that the master or the insurance carrier of that master 
has a property right in the servant as in an automobile 
while he is working in the course of his employment¥ 
May the insurance carrier recover for the destruction 
of that right to the extent of its loss~ If anyone shall 
answer these questions in the affirmative, he will find 
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it impossible to extricate himself from the dilemma 
created by his affirmative answer. 
The action to be prosecuted against the wrongdoer 
1s not mentioned in Sections 102-11-5, 102-11-6 and 
102-11-7, and therefore even though it may be called a 
property right, it is not capable of inheritance under 
those sections, and those sections are exclusive. Anyone 
who wades that ditch will find the water more than chin-
deep. Looking at the action from the standpoint of the 
wrongdoer, his liability ceases with his death. 
Section 104-3-19 provides: 
''An action or proceeding does not abate by 
the death or any disability of a party, or by the 
transfer of any interest therein, if the cause of 
action or proceeding survives or continues." (Ital-
ics ours.) 
No person reading this statute can escape the in-
ference that if the cause of action does not survive, then 
the pending action abates and cannot be revived. 
CONTENTION NO. 3 
THE RIGHT CLAIMED IN THE COMPLAINT IS A 
PERSONAL RIGHT WHICH THE DEPENDENTS 
MIGHT HAVE ELECTED TO TAKE; IT IS NOT A 
PROPERTY RIGHT. 
Regardless of the rights of the insurance carrier 
under Section 42-1-58, or independent of that statute, an 
examination of the complaint in the case at bar compels 
and permits but one conclusion, and that is that the plaint-
iffs are seeking to recover damages from the defendant 
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on the ground that the defendant has violated the person-
al rights of the deceased, Robert Johanson, causing a 
personal injury to said Johanson, and that said personal 
injury caused the death of Johanson. These plaintiffs 
claim that they were dependent upon the deceased for 
support. They unequivocally allege that they claimed 
and were awarded compensation for and on account of 
the death of the servant, and now they seek, by means 
of the alleged assignment, to thwart and nullify the elec-
tion which they intentionally made to take compensation. 
The purpose of the statute was to give the dependents 
a choice of one of two remedies. That statute in plain 
terms provides that when compensation is claimed by 
dependents and awarded to them, they have completely 
and forever exhausted their remedies and consequent 
rights against all persons for and on account of the death 
of the servant. By making their claim for compensation, 
and obtaining its award, they debarred and precluded 
themselves from thereafter making any further claim 
either for compensation or damages. 
It is true that in their complaint they do not allege 
that the insurance carrier has paid the compensation 
awarded, or any part thereof, and they make no allega-
tion from which such fact might be inferred. As indicat-
ing a possible desire to exclude such fact from the com-
plaint, they allege that the insurance carrier, by reason 
of the award, ''became subrogated to the rights of the 
plaintiffs herein in said cause of action against the de-
fendant under the provisions of Section 42-1-58 Revised 
Statutes of Utah, 1933; that subsequent thereto, on the 
29th day of August, 1939, the said London Guarantee & 
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Accident Company, Ltd., for a valuable consideration, 
executed and delivered to the plaintiffs herein a waiver 
of said right of subrogation and an assignment of its 
said cause of action against said defendant herein.'' 
(Italics inserted.) 
If this allegation is given its full force it means: 
(a) that the insurance carrier was subrogated without 
payment of the award; (b) that without payment of the 
award the insurance carrier, for a valuable consideration, 
waived its right of subrogation; (c) in order to make such 
alleged waiver effective, to clinch the same, so to speak, 
the insurance carrier made an assignment to the plaint-
iffs. 
In appellants' brief, on Page 14 it is said: "It is to 
be noted, however, that the insurance carrier not only 
assigned its cause of action but waived its right of sub-
rogation." It is then contended in that brief that 
aside from the assignment and waiver the plaintiffs can 
maintain this action in view of their interest. 
This Court in its opinion has held that the plaintiffs 
cannot maintain this action in their own right; that Sec-
tion 42-1-58 offered them one of either of two alterna-
tives; that their acceptance of either waived their rights 
under the other; that they have no right in the action to 
recover damages from the third person after they have 
claimed and been awarded compensation; that they may 
not even insist that an action against the third person 
shall be brought by the insurance carrier. 
All of the justices of this court seem to be agreed 
th~t the plaintiffs must sue, if they may sue at all, as 
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assignees of the insurance carrier's cause of action. All 
of the justices seem to agree that except for the provi-
sions of Section 42-1-58 (which has been shown not to 
authorize any assignment) the only test of assignability 
of an action is survivability. 
Now, if the attempt of the dependants is made suc-
cessful by the decision of this Court, then that which was 
made an irrevocable election ~their part becomes revo-
cable at any time during the period required for the pay-
ment of the award of compensation, or during the pe-
riod while the action is not barred by the statute of limi-
tations. These dependents during that period, however, 
indefinite it may be, may ignore, even flout, the award 
of the Industrial Commission and agree with the insur-
ance carrier that the award need not be paid, and in con-
sideration of its release the dependents may take that 
which they never had-the right to bring an action against 
the third party as if they, the dependents, had never 
claimed or obtained an award of compensation. 
The action alleged in the complaint does not survive 
because it is not an action: 
(1) For the recovery of any property, real or 
personal, or for the possession thereof, or to quiet 
title thereto or to determine any adverse claim there-
on; 
nor 
(2) Is it an action founded upon contract (ex-
press or implied (Section 102-11-5); 
nor 
( 3) Is it an action against any person who has 
wasted, destroyed, taken, carried away or converted 
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to his own use the goods of a testator or intestate in 
his lifetime; 
nor 
( 4) Is it an action for trespass committed on 
the real estate of a decedent in his lifetime (Section 
102-11-6); 
nor 
( 5) Is it an action against executor or admin-
istrator of any testator or intestate who in his life-
time has wasted, destroyed, taken, carried away or 
converted to his own use the goods or chattels of 
any such person or committed any trespass on the 
real estate of such person. (Section 102-11-7.) 
The action for which recovery is sought is not in-
cluded in the survivor statutes of the Probate Code of 
this state. Therefore, it does not survive. Even if pend-
ing in court, it abates unless it survives or continues. 
(Sections 104-3-19.) 
Not surviving, it is not a property right. Even under 
the broad terms of the Probate Code, only those things 
which survive are capable of inheritance. These and only 
these are property in the true sense of that word. Every-
thing generally assignable or capable of general assign-
ability is capable of inheritance, and is property because 
when it is generally assignable it is capable of a legal ex-
istence, separate and apart from its original owner. If it 
is generally assignable it is not in any sense personal to 
its owner; it is from a legal standpoint as sound and 
as capable of use, enjoyment, protection and enforce-
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ment when owned by any person as when owned by one 
particular person. 
The right to recover damages for injuries resulting 
in death is one created by statute. The first statute was 
passed in this territory in 187 4. With the coming of state-
hood the power of the legislature to abrogate that right 
of action was prohibited by the Constitution; but in 1920 
the people of this state amended the Constitution and 
provided that the legislature might abrogate the right 
of action to recover damages for injuries resulting in 
death if compensation for such injuries was pro-
vided by law. This Supreme Court has held that be-
cause of the amendment of 1920 the legislature may pro-
vide compensation in lieu of the right to recover dam-
ages, but the legislature may not take from the depend-
ents their rights to some compensation. 
Halling vs. Industrial Commission, 71 Utah, 
112; 263 Pac. 78 (1927). 
It seems clear that while under the constitutional 
provision as it has existed since 1920, the legislature of 
this state has no power to entirely abrogate the right of 
the dependents of a deceased servant to compensation, 
that legislature may, after providing for such compensa-
tion, entirely deny to the dependents the right of action 
to recover damages for injuries resulting in death. 
In the case at bar that right to recover damages 
never vested in the dependents. They had the choice of 
the two remedies and they voluntarily and intelligently 
elected to take the right to compensation. From thereon 
their right to recover damages was as nonexistent as at 
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common law. The insurance carrier had no vested right 
to recoYer damages for injuries resulting in the death of 
Johanson until it had paid the compensation awarded. 
The right of action of tort for personal injuries is not 
property. 
niulvey YS. City of Boston, 83 N. E. 402; 197 
Mass. 178; 14 Ann. Cas. 349 (1908). 
If the injur:~ did not result in death, then at common 
law it was a valuable personal right. If the injury re-
sulted in death, no right of recoYery existed. 
In the :Jiassachusetts case just cited, Mr. Chief Jus-
tice Knowlton, referring to a claim in an action of tort, 
said: 
''In some sense of the word such a claim is 
not property. It is not assignable, and it cannot 
be appropriated by creditors in proceedings in 
bankruptcy or insolvency.'' 
Holt vs. Stollenwerck, 17 4 Ala. 213; 56 So. 
912 (1911). 
In this Alabama case the facts were, that the widow 
of Charles ~I. Bryan intermarried with T. G. Holt, pend-
ing a suit by Bryan's administrator to recover damages 
for his wrongful death. Afterwards, while the suit was 
yet undetermined, the wife of Holt and widow of Bryan 
died. Still later the administrator had a recovery of 
substantial damages. The surviving second husband 
petitioned the court to be allowed to participate in the 
damages which had been recovered because of the death 
of Bryan, the first husband. These damages constituted 
the entire estate of Mrs. Holt. 
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Under the statutes of Alabama it is provided that if 
a married woman having a separate estate died intestate, 
leaving a husband living, he was entitled to one-half of 
the estate. It was further provided by the Alabama stat-
utes that all of the property of the wife held by her pre-
vious to the marriage, or to which she became entitled 
after the marriage, was her separate property, not sub-
ject to the liabilities of the husband. The death statute 
provided that the damages recovered were not subject 
to the payment of the debts or liabilities of the testator 
or intestate, but must be distributed according to the 
statute of distribution. (When judgment was recovered 
it was property.) 
According to the Utah law as it has existed from 
the time of its first death statute to the present day, the 
proceeds recovered in a death action have never been 
subject to the payments of the debts or liabilities of the 
deceased, but have always been a fund for particularly 
named beneficiaries. 
In this Alabama case the second husband contended 
that the cause of action arising out of the death of Mrs. 
Holt's first husband became a part of the property of 
her estate. The Alabama court said: 
"we state our conclusion that the mere right to 
sue for damages conferred by section 2486 of the 
Code, is not property, within the meaning of the 
statutes of distribution.'' 
By way of discussion the Court further said: 
"It is the generally, if not universally, ac-
cepted American doctrine that all causes of action 
arising. from torts to real or personal property, 
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by zchich its value is di·rninished, as well as choses 
ex contractu, survive and pass to the executor 
or administrator as assets in his hand, and are 
in consequence assignable. See note to McCor-
mack vs. Toronto Railway Company, 7 Am. & 
Eng. Ann. Cas. 500. It is also well settled that, 
in the absence of statutory provision, rights of 
action for torts purely personal do not survive, 
and are not assignable. Weller vs. Jersey City 
Railway Company, 68 N. J. Eq. 659, 61 Atl. 459; 
Id., 6 Am. & Eng. Ann. Cas. 442. Scores of 
adjudicated cases might be cited to both these 
propositions. The right to prosecute an action 
for the wrongful death of his decedent is vested 
by the statute creating the right in the personal 
representative for a definite legislative purpose, 
to prevent homicide. In prosecuting such action, 
the personal representative does not act strictly 
in his capacity as administrator of the estate of 
his decedent, because he is not proceeding to re-
duce to possession the estate of his decedent, but 
rather he is asserting a right arising after his 
death, and because the damages recovered are not 
subject to the payment of the debts or liabilities 
of the decedent. He acts rather as an agent of 
legislative appointment for the effectuation of 
the legislative policy, and upon recovery as a 
quasi trustee for those who stand in the relation 
of distributees to the estate strictly so called. 
White vs. Ward, 157 Ala. 345, 45 South. 166, 
18 L. R. A. (N. S.) 568. And the right is vested 
in the personal representative alone. No one else, 
under any circumstances except in case of the 
death of a minor child, where section 2485 gives 
a preferred right ot the father or mother, cam 
maintain the action in any forum. The mere right 
of action is therefore nonassignable at law and 
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in equity. The right of disposition is inherent in 
every notion of property. On these considera-
tions of general law, we are of opinion that Mrs. 
Holt had no property right in the cause of action 
created by the statute. Her right was personal 
merely.'' (Italics inserted.) 
If anyone cares to read the balance of the opinion 
he will find the Court holding that the words ''things 
in action, '' as used in another section of the Code, include 
only assignable rights of action, and that "no debt arises 
out of tort.'' 
It is settled law in this state that the right of action 
to recover damages for injuries resulting in death is 
for the benefit of the heirs of the deceased under Section 
104-3-11. The personal representative of the deceased 
may be a party plaintiff in prosecuting the action, but 
he prosecutes for the benefit of the heirs of the 
deceased. 
Under Section 42-1-58 the dependents of the em-
ployee, in case the latter's injury results in death, may 
at their option claim compensation or have their action 
for damages against the third person whose act wrong-
fully caused the death of the employee. If they do not 
take compensation they are then vested with the right 
of action which may exist against the third person. This 
action they prosecute in their own names, and, as has 
been held by the Utah Supreme Court in Thorpe vs. 
Union Pacific Railway Co., 24 Utah, 475, supra, the 
action cannot be commenced or maintained in the name 
of any other person than the one to whom the right is 
given by the statute. If the dependents claim and are 
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awarded compensation, then the statutory party plaintiff 
is either the master or its insurance carrier. This in-
surance carrier under these circumstances is the only 
person who can maintain the action in any form. On 
recovery, if there is a recovery, the insurance carrier 
plaintiff becomes a judgment-creditor, and as such that 
carrier is charged with the duty of distributing the fund 
recovered according to the terms of the statute. 
Nature of .Action; It ·is not Contractual: It is be-
lieved to have been established that no basis can be found 
for either the origin or existence of this right of action 
in contract, express or implied. 
It is not Proprietary in Character: A mere violation 
of a duty imposed by law, resulting in pecuniary loss 
to the person whose rights are violated without enrich-
ment or pecuniary gain to the tort-feasor cannot give 
rise to a proprietary remedy. The inconvenience, dis-
tress or pecuniary prejudice of that person cannot be 
conceived of as a res or thing in the possession of· the 
wrongdoer. The value of the estate of the deceased 
was in no wise diminished by the wrongful act. No debt 
arises out of tort in advance of judgment, and the pro-
ceeds of the judgment become the property of the in-
surance carrier, to be used and paid out as is provided 
by statute. What is said here of a breach of duty imposed 
by law is equally true of a broken promise. 
Keigwin Cases in Common Law Pleading, P. 38. 
It is an .Action Ex Delicto: The injured person may 
have suffered great pecuniary loss without the wrongdoer 
being enriched in the slightest particular. Under such 
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circumstances, in the absence of an express contract to 
reimburse, the only remedy remaining is for the personal 
tort. That and only that constitutes the wrong. There 
is no breach of contract because there is no contract. 
There is no money had and received either wrongfully 
or as a loan, or paid out upon request. There is no prop-
erty received by way of bailment or conversion. Not the 
slightest benefit passed to the wrongdoer. There was 
not the slightest depletion of the estate of the deceased. 
It is charged in the complaint of the plaintiffs that 
the defendant negligently caused the death of their son, 
Robert Johanson. If such fact is established by proof, 
the defendant must answer for the damage caused to 
the dependents by its tort. It is the damage done to 
and the loss sustained by the dependents that consti-
tutes the measure of recovery. If that measure is to be 
determined by the enrichment of the defendant, there 
could be recovery. If recovery by insurance carrier 
under this section of the statute is limited to the money 
paid out by insurance carrier to satisfy the award of 
compensation, then that is a mere limitation of damages 
on the theory that the insurance company suffered no 
greater loss than that which it paid out, and that the 
dependents can have no interest in the recovery. Albrecht 
Co. vs. Iron Works, 200 Mich. 109; 166 N. W. 855 (1918). 
Even under this construction of the statute, the action 
against the defendant is still what it would have been 
if the dependents had elected to prosecute it in their own 
names for themselves. 
At common law the action was trespass on the case. 
It was not debt, detinue, covenant, trespass, ejectment 
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or replevin. These were the common law actions prior 
to A. D. 1~85. It was not trover; it was not assumpsit, 
but it was trespass on the case. Case, trover and as-
sumpsit eame into existence by virtue of the Statute 
of Westminster, 1~85. (It is well to recur to these rather 
ancient actions.) 
Prior to that year there was no remedy: 
''I. For wrongs to person or property which 
were done without force; 
II. For wrongs which, though involving 
force, were not immediately injurious, but only 
indirectly and by consequence ; 
III. For wrongs which, though forcible and 
in themselves injurious, affected property not 
in the possession of the owner ; and 
IV. For breaches of executory contracts not 
under seal, such as failure to perform a parol 
promise.'' 
Keigwin Cases in Common Law Pleading, P. 126. 
It will be noticed that in the survivor statutes, Sec-
tions 102-11-5, 102-11-6 and 102-11-7, causes of action 
arising from torts to real or personal property by which 
the estate's value is diminished (without any enrichment 
of wrongdoer) survive for and against the estates of 
deceased persons. These are causes of action ex delicto. 
They are purely personal torts committed as against 
the property, and because their destruction or injury 
diminishes the value of the estate of the persons owning 
such property, these rights of action have been made to 
survive along with the others designated in the statute; 
but the statutes can be read and re-read and no provision 
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can be found from which it may be concluded that there 
is any property right claimed. in this complaint of the 
plaintiffs. There is no property right created by the 
provisions of the statute Sec. 42-1-58. The only property 
right that could exist would be one worked out on the 
theory of the Louisiana case, 93 So. 613. (Supra.) That 
theory is at war with all sound legal concept. 
CONTENTION NO. 4 
THE INSURANCE CARRIER ACQUIRED NO PER-
SONAL OR PROPERTY RIGHT UNTIL IT HAD 
PAID IN FULL THE COMPENSATION AWARD. 
AN ASSIGNMENT OF A NON-EXISTENT RIGHT 
IS VOID. 
The discussion of Contentions Nos. 1, 2 and 3 has 
necessarily explained the reasons which constitute the 
basis for Contention No. 4. 
As the writer of this brief understands the opinions 
of this Court, it seems unnecessary to argue that it was 
full payment of the award of compensation by the insur-
ance carrier that vested in that carrier any right of 
action against the defendant. The assignment of a non-
existent right of action would be a nullity, even though 
the right of action when it came into existence would 
under the law be assignable. An executory agreement 
to assign a right of action not yet in existence would 
not and could not mature the right of action. To mature 
it, requires full payment. 
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As Federal J udg·e Baker said : 
''It is contrary to rational thought to say 
that a suit can be maintained upon the assignment 
of a non-existent thing." ( 27 5 Fed. 333.) 
See also Albrecht Co. vs. Iron Works, 200 
Mich. 109; 166 N. W. 855 (1918). 
If the thing itself cannot legally exist, then any 
assignment of such non-existent thing is also non-existent. 
CONTENTION NO. 5 
THIS COURT, HAVING HELD THAT THE COM-
PLAINT DOES NOT STATE FACTS SUFFICIENT 
TO CONSITUTE A CAUSE OF ACTION, HAD NO 
POWER TO REVERSE THE JUDGMENT OR TO 
ALLOW THE PLAINTIFFS TO AMEND THEIR 
COMPLAINT. 
It would seem that the above statement cannot 
be otherwise than absolutely accurate from a legal stand-
point. Let us look at the record facts as they are shown 
by the transcript. 
It appears from the transcript, not only from its 
minute entries but from the judgment itself, that the 
Trial Court heard this case on the 4th day of April, 
A. D. 1940, on the complaint of the plaintiffs and the 
demurrer of the defendant thereto, all counsel appear-
ing; that thereafter, on the 6th day of May, A. D. 1940, 
the Trial Court made an order sustaining the demurrer 
of the defendant to the plaintiffs' complaint, and in 
said order allowed the plaintiffs ten days within which 
to amend; that regular notice in writing was given 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
78 
by the attorneys for the defendant and served upon the 
attorneys for the plaintiffs on the 6th day of May, A. D. 
1940; and it further appears "that the plaintiffs, by 
their attorneys, have declined this right to amend and 
failed and refused to plead further, and thereby elected 
to stand upon the complaint of the plaintiffs, and the 
time having fully expired within which the plaintiffs 
might make any amendment to said complaint," it was 
ordered, adjudged and decreed that the plaintiffs take 
nothing by their action; that the complaint be and the 
same is hereby dismissed. This judgment was entered 
in open court on the 17th day of May, A. D. 1940. 
(Tr. 12-13.) 
(Please examine the Transcript.} 
The Trial Court did not deliver or file any opinion, 
stating the reasons that impelled that Court to sustain 
the demurrer. The demurrer, however, was a general 
one, and under the Utah Code the objection that the 
complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute 
a cause of action may be raised in a cause at any stage 
of the proceedings. (Sec. 104-8-6.) 
At common law and under the Code of Utah the 
granting of leave to amend a complaint is discretionary 
with the Trial Court when a demurrer has been sustained 
by the Court, and an appellate court will not interfere 
with the trial court's discretion unless a clear abuse of 
that discretion by the Trial Court is shown; but there 
need be no concern relative to an abuse of discretion 
because the Trial Court in this case expressly granted 
leave to the plaintiffs to amend, and the plaintiffs, by 
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their counsel, refu.sed to amend and elected to stand 
upon their complaint. This amounted to a submission to 
judgment on the facts alleged by the plaintiffs and for 
the purposes of the demurrer admitted by the defendant. 
Gammon Ys. Bunnell, 22 Utah, 421; 64 Pac. 958 
(1900). 
In this case the Utah Supreme Court held that when 
the Supreme Court set aside the judgment of the court 
below sustaining a judgment, then unless the defendant 
whose demurrer had been sustained in the District Court 
but overruled in the Supreme Court withdrew his de-
murer, the judgment should be ordered in favor of the 
plaintiff as prayed for in the complaint. On rehearing 
the defendant having presented an answer on the merits 
showing a meritorious defense, this Court in the exercise 
of its discretion permitted the defendant to file its answer 
to the complaint on ''such terms as may be just.'' 
In Stewart vs. Douglass, 148 Cal. 511 ; 83 Pac. 699 
(1906), the S~preme Court of California held: 
''When a demurrer is sustained to a com-
plaint, it is within the discretion of the court either 
to allow an amended complaint to be filed, or to 
give judgment forthwith in favor of the defendant. 
The appellate court will in every such case sustain 
the action of the court below, whatever course it 
may take, unless it is made to appear by the record 
that there has been an abuse of discretion.'' 
And again: 
''The right to amend after the filing of a 
demurrer is absolute only when it is exercised 
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before the demurrer is argued and submitted to 
the court for decision." 
Section 104-14-3 among other things provides for the 
amendment of any pleading once by a party as of course 
before the time for pleading to it has expired, or after 
demurrer and before the trial of the issue of law there-
on. A refusal of leave to amend cannot be held to be an 
abuse of discretion where there is nothing in the record 
to show that the plaintiff asked leave to amend in any 
designated particular or in any way specify the nature 
of any proposed amendment. 
Marsh vs. Lott, 156 Cal. 643; 105 Pac. 968 (1910). 
In the case of Marsh vs. Lott, supra, the demurrer 
of the defendant to the complaint was based upon several 
counts, among which was that the plaintiff was guilty of 
laches. As a matter of fact, a prior suit had been brought 
by plaintiff against defendant, but the fact of such effort 
on the part of the plaintiff was not alleged in the com-
plaint. If this fact had been alleged the plaintiff would 
have avoided the bar of laches, but he might have shown 
himself estopped by the judgment entered in the former 
case. In the Supreme Court of California on appeal, 
the plaintiff contended that such court should take judi-
cial notice of the prior action brought by plaintiff against 
the defendant, but the Supreme Court held that it knew 
of no rule warranting such judicial notice, and the Su-
preme Court then said: 
''As to the refusal to allow plaintiff to amend 
his amended complaint, there is nothing in the 
record to indicate that he asked leave in the su-
perior court to amend in any designated particu-
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lar, or in any way specified therein the nature 
of any proposed amendment. We do not see how, 
under such circumstances, we could hold that the 
superior court abused its discretion.'' (Citing 
Kleinclaus vs. Dutard, 147 Cal. 252, 81 Pac. 516, 
and cases cited therein.) 
An interesting case is that of Bailey vs. Holden, 50 
Vt. 14 (1877). In the Bailey case the defendants demur-
red for want of equity. That demurrer was overruled. 
The defendants then appealed to the Supreme Court of 
Vermont where ruling was affirmed. It is best to quote 
its language : 
''Upon the opinion being read and the deci-
sion announced, counsel for the defendants asked 
leave to withdraw the demurrer, and to be per-
mitted to make answer, and defend on the facts 
on reasonable terms. This would require that 
the decree should be reversed, and the cause 
remanded, to be proceeded with de novo. The ap-
plication was denied. It was deemed unjust to 
the orator to subject him to the protraction of the 
litigation, after it had gone to the final decision 
in the Supreme Court, upon such defense as the 
defendants elected to make, and upon their ap-
peal from a decree against them in the Court of 
Chancery. It was their right, in accordance with 
rule and usage, in an answer as to matters of fact, 
to have traversed the sufficiency of law of the 
facts alleged in the bill, as by demurrer, and to 
the same effect. Having chosen to rest their 
defense upon the facts confessed by the demurrer, 
and carried the experiment to the last extremity, 
it was regarded unwarrantable to allow the litiga-
tion and the decision upon it to go for nothing, and 
permit the cause to be put back as it was upon the 
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filing of the bill, when the only reason assigned 
for it, was, that 'defendants' solicitors had erred 
in their judgment of the law.' " (Italics inserted.) 
Billesbach vs. Larkey, 161 Cal. 649; 120 Pac. 31 
(1911). 
In this case a demurrer to the third amended com-
plaint was sustained. Leave to amend further was re-
fused and judgment was rendered. The Supreme Court 
held that the refusal to amend was not an abuse of dis-
cretion. In the course of its opinion the Court said: 
''There were, however, several other causes 
of demurrer assigned. If we find the ruling justi-
fiable on any of the other grounds the judgment 
must be affirmed. We cannot take notice of the 
supposed reasons of the court below and we are 
not confined to those reasons in considering the 
rights of the parties upon the appeal." 
This case held that the judgment for the defendant 
should be affirmed if the appellate court could sustain 
a demurrer to the complaint upon any of the grounds of 
demurrer, whether on the particular ground stated by 
the trial court or not, and this holding in this Larkey 
case is in accord with that of Burke vs. Maguire, 154 
Cal. 456; 98 Pac. 21 (1908). In this Burke case it ap-
peared that the demurrer of the defendant had been 
sustained and judgment entered. Quoting from the 
opinion of 1\Ir. Justice Shaw: 
"It is claimed that the order cannot be af-
firmed unless this court agrees with the lower 
court in the opinion referred to in the order. We 
do not so understand the law. If the complaint 
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is insufficient upon any ground properly specified 
in the demurrer, the order must be sustained, 
although the lower court may have considered it 
sufficient in that respect, and may in its order 
have declared it defective only in some particular 
in which we hold it to be good. The defendant is 
entitled to the decision of this court on all ques-
tions presented by the demurrer and necessary 
to the decision made." (Citing authorities.) 
The demurrer in the case at bar is general and avers 
that the complaint does not state facts sufficient to 
constitute a cause of action in favor of the plaintiffs 
and against the defendant. The Trial Court sustained 
that demurrer, and this Court has held that the Trial 
Court committed no error in sustaining the demurrer of 
this defendant. The appellants, the plaintiffs, appealed 
to this Court. They did not allege or assign any error 
on the part of the Trial Court relative to the matter of 
amending their complaint, because that question never 
came up in the Trial Court. It could not come up be-
cause the Trial Court did not deny the plaintiffs' right 
to amend their complaint; on the contrary, the Trial 
Court held the demurrer under advisement from the 4th 
day of April until the 6th day of May, 1940, and when 
he sustained the demurrer on that last named day, in 
his order the Trial Court allowed the plaintiffs ten days 
within which to amend. Notice was given of this order 
on May 6, 1940, and then on the 17th day of May, 1940, 
after the plaintiffs had had ten full days' notice, the 
plaintiffs, by their attorneys, declined this right to amend, 
and failed and refused to plead further. 
What could the Trial Court do but enter a judgment 
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for the defendant~ The Trial Court took the only course 
that could have been taken and entered such judgment. 
The plaintiffs appealed to this court. They made, served 
and filed their assignments of error, consisting of three 
in number, and the only complaint that is made in those 
as~ignments is that the Trial Court erred is sustaining 
the defendant's demurrer, and erred in dismissing the 
plaintiffs' complaint and in rendering judgment for the 
defendant. There is not one word that could be construed 
into a complaint relative to any denial of an opportunity 
for amending the complaint. The appellants did not 
assign any error committed by the Trial Court relative 
to an amendment of the complaint, because the Trial 
Court did not commit any error. Even in this court 
the appellants have not claimed any right as yet to amend 
their complaint. 
It has been held that the error of a trial court, if 
one is made, must be pointed out in this court by assign-
ment, and that assignments not argued will be deemed 
waived, and that assigning a wrong reason for a correct 
rule is a harmless error, and that the only questions 
before an appellate court on appeal are those raised by 
assignments of error and presented in appellant's brief. 
First National Bank vs. Brown, 20 Utah, 85; 57 Pac. 
877 (1899). 
Advance Rumley-Thresher Co. vs. Stohl, 75 Utah, 
124; 283 Pac. 731 (1929). 
In this Stohl case the lower court had refused to 
admit evidence to support one of the defenses alleged 
by the defendant, and of this matter this Court unani-
mously said: 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
85 
''We are now asked to determine the question 
whether in the event of reversal the defendant 
may not urge this defense. This we may not do. 
The question was not presented by any assignment 
of error, nor is it discussed in the briefs." 
Cornia vs. Cornia, 80 Utah, 486; 15 Pac. (2d) 631 
(1932). 
In this case this Court dismissed an appeal because 
there had been a failttre to serve or file in this court 
assignments of error within the time prescribed by court 
rule. This court will not search the record for error, and 
reasons, even when given by a trial court, are after 
all immaterial in this court if the ruling of the trial 
court is correct. 
Liberty Coal Co. vs. Snow, 53 Utah, 298; 178 Pac. 
341 (1919). 
In this Snow case Mr. Justice Frick said: 
"That the district court, in its rulings at the 
trial, may not have-followed all of the foregoing 
reasons, and may have indulged in others, is 
wholly immaterial. In view of the conceded facts 
the only question here is whether the judgment is 
right as a matter of law.'' 
A party cannot complain that leave to amend was 
not granted when he did not ask for it. 
Adeline Mfg. Co. vs. Phillips, 118 Mich. 162; 76 
N. W. 371; 42 L. R. A. 531 (1898). 
In this Michigan case it was held that the complainant 
should have been given an opportunity to amend his 
bill if he desired it, but the Court said: 
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"We cannot assume that he did, and the rec-
ord does not show that he asked for it, so far as 
we are advised.'' 
(In the case at bar the record affirmatively shows 
that the plaintiffs declined the right to amend given by 
the Court.) 
This is an action at law, not a suit in equity. The 
jurisdiction of this Court is exclusively appellate in such 
a case. (Section 4, Art. VIII, Utah State Constitution.) 
"In equity cases the appeal may be on ques-
tions of both law and fact; in cases at law the 
appeal shall be on question of law alone." (Sec. 
9, Art. VIII, Utah State Constitution.) 
The right to amend was one to be determined by the 
District Court in the exercise of its judicial discretion. 
The District Court determined and granted that right 
to amend in the case at bar, and the plaintiffs refused and 
declined that right. Even if the District Court had abused 
its discretion and denied that right, this Court has no 
power to review that ruling unless its appellate power is 
invoked by the appellant. That power has not been in-
voked. There is no assignment of error and there could 
not be because the District Court allowed the plaintiffs 
a right to amend. 
Even the District Court could not have granted the 
plaintiffs relief from their deliberate act had the District 
Court been petitioned to exercise such power. 
Section 104-14-4 of the Revised Statutes of Utah, 
1933, grants a broad discretion to a district court in 
granting relief in furtherance of justice. This section 
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of the statute grants the broadest discretionary powers 
to the district court, but they are discretionary with that 
court, and there is a time limit withing which that court 
may exercise such discretionary powers. If there is no 
time, where will litigation end 1 
"It is a question of power." (104 U. S. 410; 26 
L. Ed. 797 ( 1881). 
In the first portion of the section power is granted 
to allow amendments to pleading·s and proceedings ; for 
the correction of mistakes and for the enlargement of 
time, and for the filing of pleadings and motions after 
the time limited by the code has expired. It then pro-
vides: 
''and may also, upon such terms as may be just, 
relieve a party or his legal representative from 
a judgment, order or other proceeding taken 
against him through his mistake, inadvertence, 
surprise or excusable neglect; and when, for any 
reason satisfactory to the court or the judge there-
of, the party aggrieved has failed to apply for 
a new trial or other relief sought during the term 
at which such judgment, order or proceeding com-
plained of was taken, the court, or judge thereof 
in vacation, may grant the relief upon application 
made within a reasonable time, not exceeding 
ninety days after the making or occurrence of the 
judgment, order or other proceeding sought to be 
relieved from. But in no event can a motion for 
new trial be made after the time for appeal has 
passed." Section 104-14-4. (See Amd. 1939. 
Chapter 121.) 
Then follows a provision providing that nothing 
but the actual taxable costs of the action accruing on and 
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after the default shall be imposed by the court under 
the provisions of this section authorizing the imposition 
of terms as a condition upon which relief is granted. 
Peterson vs. Crosier, 29 Utah, 235; 81 Pac. 860 
(1905). 
In this case neither the defendant nor his attorney 
apeared at the trial. The case was tried in their ab-
sence and a verdict of $2500 was rendered in favor of the 
plaintiff and against the defendant. Judgment was en-
tered in accordance with the verdict on June 3, 1904. On 
October 31, 1904, within the time for appeal as then 
provided, the defendant served and filed a motion to 
vacate the verdict and all proceedings subsequent thereto 
upon the ground that the same was taken against him 
through his mistake and excusable neglect. Relief in 
furtherance of justice was sought under the statute then 
known as Section 3005 of the Revised Statutes of 1898. 
That section is now, with no amendment material here, 
Section 104-14-4 of the Revised Statutes of 1933. 
Sec. 104-14-4, Chapter 121, Laws 1939. 
Bronson vs. Schulten, 104 U. S. 410; 26 L. Ed. 797 
(1881). 
This Court, speaking through Mr. Justice McCarty, 
said: 
''In order to bring a case within the foregoing 
provision of the statute, the moving party must 
show that he has used due diligence to prepare 
and appear for trial, and present his defense, and 
that he was prevented from doing so because of 
some accident, misfortune, or combination of cir-
cumstances over which he had no control. If, how-
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ever, the 'record discloses mere carelessness, lack 
of attention, or indifference to his rights on the 
part of applicant or his counsel, he cannot expect 
an opportunity to redeem the past. If the party's 
negligence is without excuse or justification, he 
must abide the consequences.' '' (Citing authori-
ties.) 
In the case at bar there was no negligence on the part 
of the attorneys for the plaintiffs. They were present, 
and in the language of the judgment they failed and re-
fused to amend ~heir complaint, and the judgment is 
analogous to one as entered upon default. 
''The pleader is not required to amend but 
may stand on his pleading and suffer judgment.'' 
Ellis Co. vs. Brannen, 161 Ala. 573; 49 So. 1034 
(1909). 
On appeal he has a right to claim that the ruling 
in sustaining the demurrer was erroneous, but surely 
he has no right to claim an error on the part of the trial 
court for not allowing him to amend when the trial court 
did allow him to amend and he refused to amend. Then 
again, we are confronted with the rule of law briefly 
stated as: ''Right Ruling for Wrong Reason.'' 
''A right ruling will be sustained though 
based on a wrong reason.'' 
Liberty Coal Co. vs. Snow, 53 Utah, 298; 178 Pac. 
341 ( 1919) supra. 
Jeffries vs. Fraternal Society, 135 Iowa, 284; 112 
N. W. 786 supra. 
Billesbach vs. Larkey, 161 Cal. 649; 120 Pac. 31 
( 1911) supra. 
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Burke vs. Maguire, 154 Cal. 456; 98 Pac. 21 (1908) 
supra. 
Fields vs. Kincaid, 67 Colo. 20; 184 Pac. 832 (1919). 
Board vs. First State Bank, 77 Okla. 291 ; 188 Pac. 
115 (1920). 
Perkins vs. Peterson, 67 Colo. 101; 185 Pac. 660 
(1919). 
Dunkin vs. Galloway, 75 Okla. 125; 181 Pac. 939 
(1919). 
Babcock vs. Engel, 58 Mont. 597; 194 Pac. 137 
(1920). 
Ex Parte Hunter (Cal.) 195 Pac. 75 (1921). 
British-American Ins. Co. vs. Wilson, 77 Conn. 559; 
60 Atl. 293 ( 1905). 
Lewiston vs. Stoddard, 78 Conn. 575; 63 Atl. 621 
(1906). 
As late as 1920 it was held by this court that '' al-
though the court may believe a decree to be erroneous 
in a particular matter, it has no alternative but to affirm 
the decree where such matter is not presented for re-
view." 
Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co. vs. Shurtliffe, 
56 Utah 196, 189 Pac. 587 (Pages 591, 593) 
(1920). 
Up until the announcement of the decision in this 
case it has been generally supposed by the bench and 
the bar, by lawyers of long and short experience, that 
when a demurrer to the plaintiff's complaint has been 
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sustained, and when the plaintiff has been granted the 
right to amend and when that plaintiff has refused to 
exercise that right, the burden was upon the plaintiff 
for the result of any mistake that such party or the 
counsel might make in declining to amend. Competent 
lawyers often have taken leave to amend their complaint 
for no other purpose than to check over the facts with 
the allegations contained in the complaint. 
As was at one time said by Justice Lamm of the 
Supreme Court of Missouri: (10 L. R. A. (N. S.) 145) 
''The formulation of legal principles is not 
for a day or for one case. Such principles are for 
general use in like cases until overthrown.'' 
Shall the rule of practice established under Utah's 
Code of Civil Procedure since that code first came into 
being be at this time and in this case destroyed and an-
nulled 1 Shall civil procedure be made more uncertain~ 
Shall the law as it exists in every state from Connecti-
cut to California and from Florida to Montana be dis-
regarded 1 Shall this Court take jurisdiction to de-
termine a question that is not before the Court for 
review? THERE MUST BE ERROR TO JUSTIFY 
REVERSAL OF A JUDGMENT. 
Sutter vs. San Francisco, 36 Cal. 112 (1868). 
"When a demurrer to a complaint is properly 
sustained, with leave to amend, and the plaintiff 
declines to do so, the judgment will not be reversed 
on appeal in order to allow an amendment. 
THERE MUST BE ERROR TO JUSTIFY A 
REVERSAL OF A JUDGMENT." (Par. 3 of 
syllabi.) (Caps ours.) 
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Quotation from opinion: 
''The appellant, however, asks that the case 
be sent back, with leave to amend. But this we 
cannot do. The Court granted leave to amend, 
so he had the opportunity, but declined to embrace 
it. He chose to stake his case upon the demurrer, 
and final judgment was accordingly entered upon 
it. The appeal is from the judgment, and we find 
no error to vitiate it. We hold that the Court 
committed no error, so far as the record shows 
its action, and that the judgment is in all respects 
legal. We cannot, therefore, reverse it, for we 
find no error to justify such action, and plaintiff 
cannot now amend, because there is a valid final 
judgment; and there is nothing more to be done, 
without first reversing this judgment. It would 
be an anomaly in legal proceedings to hold the 
judgment in all respects correct, and then arbi-
trarily reverse it." (Italics ours.) 
Kirby vs. Superior Court, 68 Cal. 404; 10 Pac. 119 
(1886). 
Lower Court prohibited from allowing amendment 
to complaint after affirmance of judgment by Supreme 
Court. 
Quotation from opinion: 
''The judgment of this court on appeal has 
determined that there was no error in the record, 
and the parties and court a qua are alike concluded 
by it from vacating it and making another case 
for trial. The plaintiff should not be thus allowed 
to speculate or gamble on remedies." Italics ours. 
But the plaintiffs in this case and their counsel made 
no mistake in declining to amend. The unalterable 
facts of record are such that the plaintiffs cannot truth-
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fully allege that the award of compensation has been paid 
by the insurance carrier. This will explain why that al-
legation was not put in the complaint and why counsel 
for plaintiffs de&ned to amend when that right was 
given by the Trial Court. 
There has been attached to this petition and brief 
Exhibit A, a certified copy of the award of compensation 
made by the Industrial Commission of this state. 
CONTENTION NO. 6 
RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO COSTS OF THIS 
APPEAL 
This Court has held that complaint is insufficient as 
against demurrer of defendant, and yet reversed judg-
ment (Ex Gratia). Allegation that award of compensa-
tion has been paid was omitted from the complaint either 
by accident or design. It it was an accident it was due 
to the negligence of appellants here, plaintiffs below. If 
truth required the omission, as it appears to have done, 
then no one is at fault, and the Trial Court will be com-
pelled to once again enter judgment for defendant. Re-
spondent should have costs in any event. 
Chaswell vs. Delaware, 56 Fed. 529 (9 C. C. 
A.; 1893). 
Hathaway vs. United Mines Co., 42 Utah, 520; 
132 Pac. 388 ( 1913). 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion the respondent respectfully submits·· 
that no case can stand alone. This case, when finally de-
cided, must have some effect as a precedent. Having that 
effect, it is the more important to rest its decision upon 
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sound and well-established principles. The respondent 
has based its right for a reconsideration on such princi-
ples summarized as follows: 
FIRST : Subrogation is not assignment. When Sec-
tion 42-1-58 provided for subrogation of insurance car-
rier, that section by so providing did not make rights of 
action to recover for injury or death assignable; it did 
not even transfer the right of action for death from de-
pendents to insurance carrier. On the contrary, insur-
ance carrier obtained this right when it had paid the 
compensation awarded directly from the statute. The 
result follows that no one can sustain the contention that 
Section 42-1-58 made any right of action assignable. As-
signability is not affected by Section 42-1-58. Surviva-
bility is still the sole test of assignability. 
SECOND: Insurance carrier as subrogee under Sec-
tion 42-1-58 acquired no property right; no right capable 
of inheritance; no right that was capable of assignment. 
THIRD: Plaintiffs in their complaint are not seeking 
to enforce a property right, but rather are seeking to 
enforce what they allege is their own right to recover 
damages for wrongful death. They by means of an al-
leged "waiver and assignment" are seeking to revoke and 
nullify the election which they made to take compensa-
tion. 
FOURTH: Insurance carrier could not have become 
• vested with the right of action to recover damages 
from the third person until that insurance carrier had 
paid the award in full. Carrier has not paid and could not 
pay that award in full because of its express terms. There-
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fore, the insurance carrier could not assign the right 
which it did not own. Assignment of a non-existent ac-
tion is void. 
FIFTH: Long and well-established rules of law of a 
jurisdictional nature preclude this Court from allowing 
plaintiffs to amend their complaint; even the District 
Court has no such power after judgment when 90 days 
time has expired (Section 104-14-4) (Chapter 121, Laws 
1939). This is true where a most meritorious showing 
o~ mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect is 
made. The reversal of this judgment is contrary to law 
because no error of any sort can be found in that judg-
ment. A reversal cannot be granted in this case because 
the Trial Court did not commit any error. In the lan-
guage of Justice Frick, ''the only question here is whether 
the judgment is right as a matter of law." (53 Utah, 
298.) No error committed nor error assigned. 
SIXTH: There was no fault committed by counsel 
for either party either in refusing to amend or in pre-
cluding the exercise of that right given by the Trial 
Court. It is an absolute certainty that respondent was 
not at fault either as a matter of law or of ethics. Why 
should it pay costs of appeal, but why should judgment be 
reversed? 
For the reasons herein stated it is submitted that 
the judgment of the District Court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, .._ 
MARLON E. WILSON, 
ROBERT C. WILSON, 
Attorneys for Respondent. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
96 
EXHIBIT A 
CERTIFIED COPY OF COMPENSATION 
AWARD 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
UTAH 
CLAIM NO. 4005 
CARL JOHANSON and CLARA 
JOHANSON, father and mother 
respectively of Robert Johanson, 
deceased, Janet Orem, Blaine 
Orem and Emma Alveretta 
Johanson, 
Applicants, 
vs. 
ROYAL CRYSTAL SALT COM-
PANY, and/or LONDON GUAR-
ANTEE & ACCIDENT CO., 
Defendants. 
DECISION 
In conformity with notice and order of the Indus-
trial Commission of Utah, this matter was duly heard 
on August 8, 1938 at Tooele City, Utah, the applicants 
being present and represented by their attorney, Mr. 
E. LeRoy Shields; Robert A. Burns, Esquire, appearing 
for the defendants. Sworn testimony was presented 
and certain stipulations agreed to by the respective par-
ties. 
The Commission being advised in the premises, 
makes the following Findings, Conclusions and Orders: 
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FINDINGS 
On the 3rd day of June, 1938 Robert Johanson, while 
employed as truck driver, in the course of his regular 
duties, by the defendant Royal Crystal Salt Company, 
suffered accidental injury resulting in his immediate 
death, to-wit: "Was backing truck into loading plat-
form at the Cudahy Packing Company's plant at North 
Salt Lake, contacted electric current and was electro-
cuted. 
II 
On the above date, the defendant Royal Crystal 
Salt Company was an employer subject to the State In-
dustrial Act, the London Guarantee & Accident Com-
pany being its insurance carrier. The wage earned by 
Robert Johanson on the date of his fatal injury was 
$5.40 per day, the operation of the Royal Crystal Salt 
Company's plant being 5 days per week. 
III 
On the date of his fatal injury, Robert Johanson 
was one of several children living with his parents, the 
applicants herein (Carl and Clara Johanson). He was 
contributing in part to their maintenance and support, 
said parents being in fact partially dependent upon the 
decedent Robert Johanson at the time of his injury and 
death, to the extent and degree of $7.79 per week. 
IV 
The Commission finds that applicants Janet Orem, 
Blaine Orem and Emma Alvaretta Johanson were not 
dependent, in whole or in part, upon the decedent Robert 
Johanson at the time of his fatal injury. 
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v 
The applicants were represented before the Com-
mission by Mr. E. Le Roy Shields, Attorney at Law, 
Salt Lake City, Utah, and the reasonable value of such 
services are $25.00. 
CONCLUSIONS 
In view of the foregoing Findings, the Commission 
concludes that Robert Johanson was killed by reason of 
an accident arising out of or in the course of his em-
ployment, while employed by the Royal Crystal Salt 
Company, and that therefore, the defendants herein 
should be required to pay compensation to the depend-
ants of said deceased, together with burial expense, as 
provided by law. 
WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, that the Royal 
Crystal Salt Company and/ or London Guarantee and Ac-
cident Company pay to the applicants, Carl J olifison and 
Clara Johanson, of Grantsville, Utah, compensation at 
the rate of $7.79 per week for a period of six years after 
the date of fatal injury, payments to begin as of June 4, 
1938, all accrued payments to be paid in a lump sum and 
thereafter once each four weeks, unless otherwise or-
dered by the Commission. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, that the defendants 
herein pay direct to Mr. E. LeRoy Shields, Attorney at 
Law, 905 First National Bank Building, Salt Lake City, 
Utah, the sum of $25.00, deducting said sum from the 
compensation herein awarded to the applicants. 
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, that the defendants 
herein pay for the burial of decedent, Robert Johanson, 
as provided by law. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, that in case any 
party hereto desires to be further heard in these proceed-
ings or to appeal from this Decision, written application 
for rehearing herein must be filed with the Industrial 
Commission of Utah within thirty (30) days from the 
date of mailing a copy of this Decision to said parties, as 
said date is evidenced by letter of transmittal of the same 
as shown by the records or files in the office of this Com-
mission. 
The Industrial Commission of Utah retains juris-
diction over this case until all proceedings are had and 
all matters and things done herein to finally dispose of 
the same according to law. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
UTAH, 
WM. M. KNEER, 
0. F. McSHANE, 
B. D. NEBEKER, 
Commissioners. 
I hereby certify the above to be a true and correct 
copy of decision rendered by The Industrial Commis-
sion of Utah on the 22nd day of August, 1938. 
(SEAL) 
CAROLYN D. SMITH, 
Secretary. 
Industrial Commission of Utah. 
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